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ABSTRACT	  
	  
	  
	  
Grieve,	  Archibald	  Alan.	  M.A.,	  Department	  of	  Political	  Science,	  Wright	  State	  University,	  2015.	  
Understanding	  Paths	  Toward	  Strategic	  Success	  in	  NVR	  Campaigns:	  A	  Comparison	  of	  
Palestinian	  and	  South	  African	  Resistance.	  	  
	  
	  
The	  following	  paper	  fills	  a	  gap	  in	  the	  literature	  of	  nonviolent	  resistance	  (NVR)	  by	  
investigating	  when	  and	  under	  what	  circumstances	  it	  is	  necessary	  for	  nonviolent	  resistance	  
campaigns	  to	  enlist	  the	  support	  of	  outside	  actors	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  strategic	  success.	  
Using	  Gene	  Sharp’s	  pillars	  of	  power	  theory	  as	  a	  comparative	  framework,	  the	  author	  pairs	  
the	  method	  of	  process-­‐tracing	  with	  a	  most-­‐similar-­‐systems	  design	  in	  order	  to	  fashion	  a	  
time-­‐series	  experiment	  measuring	  the	  strength	  of	  each	  pillar	  of	  power	  propping	  up	  the	  
target	  regimes	  of	  South	  Africa	  and	  Israel.	  The	  results	  reveal	  that	  these	  variables	  are	  
interacting.	  The	  paper	  also	  reveals	  that	  the	  U.S.	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  both	  conflicts	  due	  to	  
the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  helped	  prop	  up	  both	  regimes	  during	  the	  period	  of	  study	  and	  makes	  
recommendations	  to	  help	  improve	  the	  chances	  for	  success	  of	  Palestinian	  nonviolence	  and	  
other	  NVR	  campaigns.	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Chapter I: Introduction 
The history of nonviolent resistance (NVR) is a long and rich tradition that crosses 
cultural, religious, and ethnic boundaries and has been used successfully throughout history to 
achieve political objectives. Massive NVR campaigns like the Indian independence movement 
against Great Britain and the civil rights movement in America demonstrate the fantastic 
opportunities for success that NVR is capable of achieving, while events like Tiananmen Square 
serve as reminders that it is not always successful. Conceptually, nonviolence has evolved over 
time and ranged from mere pacifism to Gandhi’s concept of satyagraha, which is characterized 
by an active, but nonviolent opposition to power, meeting violent force with nonviolent force. As 
Gandhi would argue, force is the constant, but non-violent force is more tactically effective. 
Gandhi went so far as to say that “[v]iolence is any day preferable to impotence . . . [because] 
there is hope for a violent man to become nonviolent. There is no such hope for the impotent.”1 
The goals and objectives of those individuals whom Gandhi labeled the “satyagrahi” (or those 
who practice nonviolence) are no less ambitious than those who pick up a gun in the hopes of 
achieving the same political outcomes. As NVR scholar Gene Sharp argues, “Nonviolent action 
is a means of combat, as is war. It involves the matching of forces and the waging of ‘battles,’ 
requires wise strategy and tactics, and demands of its ‘soldiers’ courage, discipline, and 
sacrifice.”2  
But does NVR work as well as violence? In other words, is it more or less effective in 
meeting its goals? The purpose of this thesis is to undertake a deeper investigation of the factors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Mark	  Kurlansky.	  Non-­‐violence:	  The	  History	  of	  a	  Dangerous	  Idea.	  (New	  York:	  
Random	  House,	  2008),	  147.	  
2	  Gene	  Sharp.	  The	  Politics	  of	  Nonviolent	  Action	  Part	  One:	  Power	  and	  Struggle.	  (Boston:	  
Extending	  Horizons	  Books,	  1973),	  67.	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that are predictive of NVR success through a focused, structured comparison NVR campaigns in 
South Africa and in Israel/Palestine. This chapter begins with an overview of nonviolence and a 
review of the current state of NVR literature. Chapter two moves to an examination of the 
specific puzzle my research design seeks to address, followed by hypothesis-testing of the two 
cases in question in chapters three and four, and ending with a discussion about which variables 
matter more (or most) and the policy implications of my findings in the final chapter. 
 
Literature Review 
Nonviolence has a rich history spanning millennia, perhaps most notably gaining 
adherents amongst those in the early Christian church. In his book on the history of nonviolence, 
historian Mark Kurlansky notes, “early Christians are the earliest known group that renounced 
warfare in all its forms and rejected all its institutions.”3 In the more recent past, NVR has been 
utilized by groups as disparate as the followers of Gandhi seeking to overthrow British rule in 
India, the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, and the recent uprisings in the Middle 
East against authoritarian regimes. Over the past forty years, comparative politics and 
international relations (IR) scholars have sought to understand what makes NVR successful.  
One of the earliest political scientists to turn their attention to the study of NVR was 
Gene Sharp, whose first book on NVR, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, has contributed greatly 
to the understanding of the mechanisms through which NVR campaigns successfully achieve 
their political objectives. Sharp theorizes that by systematically removing the six “pillars” of 
support that underpin a regime’s sources of consent and from which rulers derive their power, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Kurlansky,	  Non-­‐violence,	  21.	  
	   3	  
NVR can successfully topple governments and rulers.4 These pillars are theorized as consisting 
of authority, human resources and the skills and knowledge of those human resources, intangible 
factors, material resources, and the ability to enact sanctions. The first pillar, authority, is 
characterized as “the right to command and direct, to be heard or obeyed by others.”5 Sharp 
defines the second pillar of human resources as “the number of persons who obey [the regime], 
cooperate with [it], or provide [it] with assistance as well as the proportion of such persons in the 
general population, and the extent and forms of their organizations.”6 The third pillar is 
composed of the skills and knowledge of those human resources.7 The fourth pillar is comprised 
of multiple intangible factors, which Sharp classifies as “psychological and ideological factors, 
such as habits and attitudes toward obedience and submission, and the presence or absence of a 
common faith, ideology, or sense of mission.”8 Sharp’s fifth pillar of material resources is 
defined as “the degree to which the [regime] controls property, natural resources, financial 
resources, the economic system, means of communication and transportation.”9 Finally, Sharp 
defines sanctions “an enforcement of obedience’ used by rulers against their subjects to 
supplement voluntary acceptance of their authority and to increase the degree of obedience to 
their commands.”10 Examining the relative strength of each of these pillars in each target regime 
will be the focus of this study.  
Most recently NVR scholarship has shifted to assessing whether NVR campaigns are 
more successful than violent campaigns in achieving their respective political objectives. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Sharp,	  Nonviolent	  Action	  Part	  One,	  8-­‐9.	  
5	  Ibid.,	  11.	  
6	  Ibid.,	  11.	  
7	  Ibid.,	  11.	  
8	  Ibid.,	  11.	  
9	  Ibid.,	  11.	  
10	  Ibid.,	  12.	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Chenoweth and Stephan argue through a combination of quantitative analysis and a qualitative 
case-study approach that NVR is actually more successful than violence in comparing the two 
strategies’ success rates in the achievement of political objectives.11 Drilling down on the causal 
variables responsible for success in NVR movements is important, according to Chenoweth and 
Stephan, because “research regarding the successes and failures of nonviolent campaigns can 
provide insight into the most effective ways for external actors—governmental and 
nongovernmental—to aid such movements.”12 Additionally, the authors reveal that NVR 
campaigns are “more likely to establish democratic regimes with a lower probability of a relapse 
into civil war [than a country undergoing a violent transition]”.13 
Chenoweth and Stephan argue that there are two broad reasons why NVR campaigns are 
more successful than their violent counterparts. The first has to do with the ability of NVR 
campaigns to attract higher numbers of participants by reducing the barriers of participation.14 
One of the major reasons for attracting more participants is that NVR is physically easier. One 
does not necessarily need to be in peak physical condition in order to participate in a stay-home 
boycott as one would need to be in order to participate in guerrilla warfare. Additionally, many 
may find participation in NVR campaigns more ethically or religiously palatable than taking up 
arms.15 The second reason given by Chenoweth and Stephan for NVR campaigns’ higher success 
rate is that high levels of participation also “activate numerous mechanisms that improve the 
odds of success,”16 such as producing “loyalty shifts” (defections within the regime itself),17 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Erica	  Chenoweth	  and	  Maria	  Stephens.	  Why	  Civil	  Resistance	  Works:	  The	  Strategic	  
Logic	  of	  Nonviolent	  Conflict.	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2011).	  
12	  Ibid.,	  27.	  
13	  Ibid.,	  10.	  
14	  Ibid.,	  30.	  
15	  Ibid.,	  37.	  
16	  Ibid.,	  30.	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“backfiring” (shifting support away from the target regime due to the perception of an unjust 
crackdown on protestors),18 increasing the likelihood of international sanctions,19 and achieving 
greater tactical diversity and innovation.20 There are multiple reasons that these mechanisms take 
place, chief among them being the fact that the higher numbers and greater participation in NVR 
campaigns have a greater chance of making its participant population more diverse. Diversity is 
important because it is an indicator of success due to an increased level of difficulty for the target 
regime to isolate the participants.21 Higher level of participation also enhances the resilience of 
the campaign, makes tactical innovation more likely, expands the potential for civic disruption, 
and increases the likelihood of loyalty shifts (or defections) occurring within the target regime.22  
Their findings are significant, compelling, and exhaustive, given that have compiled an 
entirely new Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset that attempts to 
compile a comprehensive list of all violent and NVR campaigns from 1900-2006, yielding a list 
of 323 violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns.23 They found through statistical analysis that 
NVR campaigns were “nearly twice as likely to achieve full or partial success as their violent 
counterparts,” with a combined success and partial success rate of over 70% for NVR 
campaigns.24 Their findings suggest that the opposite is true of violent conflict, which has a 
combined success and partial success rate of approximately 35%, with a failure rate of over 
60%.25 Corroborating their findings, Max Abrahms has found that the success rate of terrorism 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Ibid.,	  46.	  
18	  Ibid.,	  50.	  
19	  Ibid.,	  52.	  
20	  Ibid.,	  55.	  
21	  Ibid.,	  40.	  
22	  Ibid.,	  10.	  
23	  Ibid.,	  6.	  
24	  Ibid.,	  7-­‐9.	  
25	  Ibid.,	  9.	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among groups that are classified as terrorist groups on the U.S. State Department’s watch list is 
only 7%,26 although limiting his findings to U.S. enemies may conceal a hidden variable of great 
power support, which I will discuss below. 
With strong evidence that NVR is more successful than violent political resistance, we 
still are left with the question of why it fails. Kurt Schock has built upon Sharp’s pillars of power 
theory by applying it to NVR movements in nondemocracies using a comparative case-method 
approach. In his analysis of the causal variables that are predictive of NVR campaign success, 
Schock has observed that the South African anti-apartheid movement’s success depended on 
“directly . . . undermining the states’ power derived from sources within society, and indirectly 
by severing the states from sources of power derived from external sources.”27 This suggests that 
the success of some NVR campaigns may depend on the effectiveness of each NVR campaign in 
attacking external pillars of power or severing them from the target regime. This question is 
important and timely in an age of many tumultuous hybrid regimes, which Hale classifies as 
regimes with elements of both democracy and authoritarianism.28 
 
The Puzzle 
The current state of the literature on NVR presents us with unanswered puzzles of (1) 
when an “extension of the NVR battlefield”29 into the international arena is necessary and (2) 
what impact external players have on an NVR campaign’s success. These questions arise 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Max	  Abrahms.	  "Why	  Terrorism	  Does	  Not	  Work."	  International	  Security	  31,	  no.	  2	  
(2006):	  43.	  
27	  Kurt	  Schock.	  People	  Power	  Movements	  in	  Nondemocracies.	  Minneapolis:	  University	  
of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2005),	  84.	  
28	  Hale,	  Henry.	  "Hybrid	  Regimes:	  When	  Democracy	  and	  Autocracy	  Mix."	  In	  The	  
Dynamics	  of	  Democratization,	  ed.	  Nathan	  Brown,	  23-­‐45.	  (Baltimore:	  John	  Hopkins	  
University	  Press,	  2011).	  
29	  Chenoweth	  and	  Stephan,	  Why	  Civil	  Resistance	  Works,	  27.	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because there are a number of failed NVR campaigns that are characterized by a high 
participation rate and a high level of campaign diversity that still failed to achieve strategic 
success (defined below). The case of the massacre against unarmed NVR protestors at 
Tiananmen Square is a prime example of a massive campaign that ended in failure,30 suggesting 
that there are more causal factors at work than just size. It becomes necessary, then, to 
understand why NVR is successful in some of these cases and not in others. In addressing this 
question, this paper builds on current NVR research to attempt to determine which variables of 
successful movements are more responsible for a successful achievement of a campaign’s 
objectives or which are more indicative of success by applying these questions to the cases of 
South Africa and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. 
One of the most pressing topics of current NVR research is Palestinian NVR in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To define the dependent variable of “campaign success” in this 
conflict, we turn to Mubarak Awad, who argues that success must include the goal of self-
determination for the Palestinian people (whether through a one or two-state solution), a 
ratification of the legitimacy and singleness of representation of the Palestinian people through 
the PLO (which was achieved in Madrid), and a just and acceptable resolution of the issues of 
settlements, land expropriation, control of natural resources, and the right of refugees to return to 
their homeland.31 Palestinian NVR’s partial success during the time period under study is 
somewhat difficult to understand, because the NVR campaign met many of the predictors of 
success that Chenoweth and Stephan identify. In 1984, Awad argued that Palestinian NVR was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Ibid.,	  39.	  
31	  Mubarak	  Awad.	  "Non-­‐Violent	  Resistance:	  A	  Strategy	  for	  the	  Occupied	  Territories."	  
Journal	  of	  Palestine	  Studies	  (University	  of	  California	  Press)	  13,	  no.	  4	  (1984):	  26.	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nothing new, beginning with the “six-month strike of 1936 and the Arab boycott of Israel.”32 He 
explains, “school and commercial strikes, petitions, protest telegrams, advertisements and 
condemnations in the daily papers, and the attempts to boycott Israeli goods are, in fact, 
manifestations of non-violent struggle.”33 Palestinian NVR continued in uneven fashion 
alongside violent struggle,34 and came into full force during the First Intifada. During this period 
of time, much of the coverage of Palestinian resistance focused on stone-throwing, however 
Chenoweth and Stephan cite Israeli Defense Force figures reported during the campaign, which 
demonstrate that “over 97% of campaign activities . . . were nonviolent, including mass 
demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, and other acts of defiance and civil disobedience.”35 The 
figures reported in 1988 included 23,053 unarmed protest incidents and only thirty eight shooting 
incidents, or in other words 0.16% of the incidents reported by the IDF were violent. In 1989 and 
1990 this rose slightly to 0.24% in both years, then to 0.84% in 1991 and 1.36% in 1992.36 Due 
to the high degree of campaign diversity and unity, it is remarkable that Palestinian NVR did not 
result in more significant concessions from the Israeli regime.  
This raises the question of why Palestinian NVR has never achieved full success. While 
Chenoweth and Stephan deal with the success rate of different NVR movements and examine the 
first Intifada in depth, they do not provide conclusive reasoning for why campaigns like the case 
of Palestinian NVR do not succeed, although they do identify a number of potentially causal 
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34	  Michael	  Hudson.	  "Developments	  and	  Setbacks	  in	  the	  Palestinian	  Resistance	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factors.37 In agreement with Schock, Chenoweth and Stephan point out that “‘extending the 
battlefield’ [by targeting pillars of support which reside outside the immediate zone of conflict] 
is sometimes necessary for opposition groups to enhance their leverage over the target.”38 For 
instance, the authors point out that in the case of South Africa, “the existence of [external] 
organized solidarity groups. . . that maintained steady pressure on governments allied with 
[South Africa] proved to be very helpful.”39 The question then becomes: When is it necessary to 
extend the NVR battlefield to other theaters by attacking the pillars of power propping up the 
target regime that may reside outside the immediate area of conflict? In other words, when does 
it become necessary to enlist the help of third parties, such as great powers, international 
solidarity groups, international organizations and NGOs, or other players who may be able to 
exert leverage against the target regime? It is for this comparison that South Africa and Israel 
have been selected, as South Africa had the support of great powers (including the United States) 
until sweeping sanctions were enacted against the apartheid regime by Europe and the United 
States in 1986, after which the NVR campaign was able to fully achieve its political goals.40 
Conversely, Israel largely maintained great power support for the duration of the period under 
study, which will be examined below. This study seeks to address these puzzles and clarify when 
an NVR movement must extend the battlefield and enlist the support of external actors in order 
to achieve strategic success. We turn now to the research design and case selection in order to 
describe how this will be accomplished.  
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Chapter II: Research Design 
 Having examined the literature and established the questions driving my research, I turn 
now to the method and logic of comparison. This chapter is devoted to laying out the research 
design of my project and the conceptualization and operationalization of the variables that will 
be examined. A Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) will be utilized in this structured, focused 
comparison of South African and Palestinian Non-Violent Resistance (NVR) campaigns. 
According to George and Bennett, a MSSD allows for the majority of the independent variables 
under study to be held constant while helping determine the strength of key independent 
variables that differ, thus accounting for the difference in the dependent variable, which in this 
case is the success or partial success of a nonviolent campaign.41 By comparing the two cases it 
will be possible to determine when external support is necessary for NVR’s success if it is found 
that the international condemnation of the apartheid regime in South Africa was responsible for 
the success of the anti-apartheid movement while those same causal variables are absent in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Before operationalizing my independent variables, I will explain the 
rationale behind my decision to choose the cases of South African and Palestinian NVR. 
 
Case Selection 
The comparison of South Africa and Israel serves as a useful contrast whereby potential 
causal factors of successful NVR campaigns may be identified. According to current NVR 
literature, we would expect Palestinians to have been much more successful in achieving their 
political goals and objectives during the First Intifada due to their high levels of campaign 
diversity and participation, both of which contributed to their ability to generate security force 
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defections (loyalty shifts) in the target regime. In the end, however, their campaign was only 
partially successful, resulting in the formation of a political organization (the Palestinian 
Authority) which, ironically, “brought to power an outside leadership that had not stepped foot 
inside the territories for almost three decades, and which promised to end the popular struggle 
against the occupation rather than lead it.”42 In this section I will outline how comparing the 
Palestinian NVR case with the anti-apartheid movement’s NVR campaign allows us to examine 
the strategic path towards campaign success taken by South African NVR resistors and examine 
the degree to which the Palestinian case failed while controlling for a number of potentially 
confounding variables.   
 
Conceptualizing and Operationalizing NVR 
The central concept for my study is the concept of nonviolent resistance (NVR). In this 
study, I borrow from multiple theorists in defining NVR as an abstention from using violence in 
pursuit of the achievement of political goals while resisting oppression, domination, or any other 
form of injustice. It must be viewed as a conscious and active opposition to an adversary (or 
multiple adversaries) and, equally, against using violence in opposing that adversary. NVR is 
further characterized by a withdrawal of consent from the dominant power-holders through non-
cooperation with and civil disobedience against unjust laws.43 Following Chenoweth and 
Stephen, I further classify a campaign as nonviolent if it is predominantly nonviolent, thereby 
allowing for the potential that some rogue actors in an NVR campaign may break with 
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nonviolent tactics, as indeed happened with stone-throwing in the First Intifada. In the end, the 
Israeli Defense Force’s own reports at the time found that 97% of Palestinian acts of civil 
disobedience during the campaign were nonviolent.44 At the same time, NVR campaigns that are 
not 100% nonviolent will be distinguished from contemporaneous campaigns utilizing violence 
alongside NVR campaigns, which are discussed below and are classified as violent radical 
flanks.45  
In order to further operationalize the concept of NVR, it is useful to outline potential 
examples of NVR that may be used. Without exhausting all 198 potential NVR methods outlined 
by Gene Sharp (or the myriad other examples that have not been listed), illustrative are some of 
the predominant ones that have occurred in these campaigns, including protests, divestment 
campaigns, marches, and refusal to pay rent or taxes.46 It is important to note, as do Chenoweth 
and Stephan, that NVR does not always manifest itself “in the form of mass protests in the 
streets . . . [but] is just as likely to take the form of stay-aways, sit-ins, occupations, economic 
boycotts, and other NVR tactics, in which the numbers of participants are extremely difficult to 
estimate.”47 It is important to remember the Palestinian slogan that “To Exist Is To Resist,” 
which is summed up in the Arabic word, sumoud, which means “perseverance or steadfastness” 
and which Broning explains as “the physical act of living as Palestinians on occupied territory, 
the refusal to disappear as a national collective with a distinctly Palestinian identity, and the 
continuation of daily life despite seemingly insurmountable obstacles constitutes a quiet but 
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politically powerful tool of resistance.”48 Similarly, South Africans migrating to large (and 
illegal) squatter settlements in defiance of South African Homeland laws represented a similarly 
powerful tool of resistance. 
With an understanding of what success looks like and what characterizes an NVR 
campaign, we turn to the concept of power, which will be adopted from Gene Sharp’s work on 
this concept. In terms of practical application, Sharp and other theoreticians of nonviolence 
maintain that every regime (whether liberal or illiberal) rests upon the obedience and consent of 
those governed by it.49 By comparing each of the pillars of power in a side-by-side comparison 
for the two case studies, it will become possible to determine in what ways South African and 
Palestinian NVR are able to attack their respective target regimes in order to determine whether 
or not each campaign has enough leverage to make the regime respond to its demands. Therefore 
a framework is needed to conceptualize and operationalize power, and there are six pillars of 
power that Sharp identifies, which are outlined in the following section. 
 
Independent Variables 
In order to draw meaningful comparisons between the two cases, it is necessary to 
understand the conceptualization of Sharp’s pillars of power and then operationalize them in 
such a way that the pillars’ relative levels of strength can be measured at key times throughout 
the duration of the respective NVR campaigns. Ideally we would have one strong key indicator 
for each pillar that could be easily observed and measured. However, due to the many possible 
ways in which concepts like “authority” may be made manifest in the data generating process, 
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the strength of these pillars must be discerned through careful observation of the historical record 
and then interpreted into some type of measurable and replicable language. The numbers that are 
generated from this process, therefore, are heuristics which are an attempt to represent their 
respective concepts as if they were ordinal-scale quantified data.  
Due to the difficulty of measuring these concepts, it is important to keep in mind Sharp’s 
observation that “both the relative power and absolute power of each of the contending groups 
are subject to constant and rapid alterations.”50 Additionally, in the footsteps of the famous 
theorist, Robert Dahl, Sharp’s theory of power is not monolithic, as if it is a single variable that 
one could easily observe, but rather is pluralistic and derived from the consent of the governed, 
whether that be through democratic or undemocratic means. Dahl’s concept of power (which he 
uses interchangeably with “influence”) is conceptualized by the observation that “A has power 
over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that he would otherwise not do.”51  
Before moving to operationalize these variables, however, a discussion on the use of the 
term “power” is necessary. Barnett and Duvall argue that, since 1964, “the discipline of 
international relations has tended to treat power as the exclusive realm of realism.”52 In light of 
this, my study will seek to build upon their charge to “employ multiple conceptions of power. . . . 
in order to generate a more robust understanding of how power works in international politics.”53 
While realism looks at power primarily as “the ability of states to use material resources to get 
others to do what they otherwise would not,”54 Sharp’s conceptualization is much more robust, 
and the realist’s lens of seeing material resources as the sole source of power is corrected by 
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viewing material support as only one of the six pillars upon which a regime’s power rests. What 
follows is a recounting of the conceptualization of Sharp’s pillars of power and an attempt to 
operationalize these pillars for the purposes of comparison of these two cases.  
 
Pillar I: Authority 
The first pillar is authority, which Sharp characterizes as “the right to command and 
direct, to be heard or obeyed by others.”55 In attempting to understand this pillar more fully, I 
also borrow from Hurd, who argues that “legitimacy . . . refers to the normative belief by an 
actor that a rule of institution ought to be obeyed.”56 The rationale for this pillar’s importance is 
best articulated by Hurd, who maintains that states do not exist in a state of anarchy in the 
international system because “to the extent that a state accepts some international rule or body as 
legitimate, that rule or body becomes an ‘authority.’” Consequently, this concept will be 
operationalized internally as the degree to which the country’s population (or areas over which 
the target regime claims to exercise authority) recognizes the regime’s legitimacy and externally 
as the extent to which other countries and international organizations recognize the target 
regime’s sovereignty and authority in international relations between states. When one regime 
exists whose legitimacy to speak for and enact sanctions against its citizens, this pillar is at one 
hundred percent capacity. Complete lack of recognition exists when no citizens or other powers 
recognize a target regime as a legitimate source of authority, which by definition means it has 
collapsed. This pillar will be translated into a numerical score (as will all other pillars)  in order 
to help better visualize the degree to which the target regime is viewed as legitimate and examine 
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this pillar at separate intervals across time. Borrowing from Dahl’s idea of operationalizing 
power, I have chosen a simple measure of power as ranging from 0 to 1, which has the advantage 
of allowing us to more easily understand the idea of “0” representing “no support” and “full 
support” being expressed with the value of “1”. Dahl explains the convenience of using such a 
simple measure in that it can be easily ranked and stacked up against other measures.57 By 
borrowing from these two prominent Power theorists, we can craft an index that can be used to 
draw comparisons across cases in an easy to understand and conceptually intuitive manner.  
To operationalize this first pillar according to this scheme, a score of ‘1’ represents a 
target regime which is recognized as the sole legitmate source of authority, whereas a ‘.75’ 
represents one whose legitimacy is in question, a ‘.5’ represents a regime whose right to rule is in 
competition with an opposing source (or sources) of authority, and a ‘.25’ represents a regime 
whose right to rule is not only challenged by an opposing authority, but is viewed as illigitimate 
and/or unable to effectively govern. A score of ‘0’ represents regime collapse. This pillar should 
not be confused with moral legitimacy (although the perceived immorality of the target regime 
may affect and influence the degree to which they are viewed as authoritative by others), nor is 
the concept of authority jeopardized solely by the fact that the regime is being targeted by an 
NVR campaign. In fact, recognition of the target regime as the political enemy, including its 
bureaucratic and military apparatus, is a signal that the regime is the authority with which 
opponents must do battle. External authority is strengthened by recognition from great powers 
and international organizations. 
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Pillars II & III: Human Resources and Skills & Knowledge 
The second pillar is human resources, which Sharp defines as “the number of persons 
who obey [the regime], cooperate with [it], or provide [it] with assistance as well as the 
proportion of such persons in the general population, and the extent and forms of their 
organizations.”58 For the purposes of this study it can, and should, be merged with the third 
pillar: skills and knowledge of those human resources.59 In this manner, property space 
compression of these independent variables is possible and pragmatic, given that separating the 
pillar of human resources from the skills and knowledge level of those human resources “serves 
no useful theoretical purpose.”60 
The first part of this tandem pillar will be operationalized as the number and strength of 
persons (both individually and collectively) within and outside of the country who help the 
regime in maintaining their monopoly on power vis-à-vis their opponents. Evidence of this type 
of power can be found in the aptitude of capable military leaders and politicians, effective 
lobbyists in other countries, the degree and strength of support from the general population, level 
of education of supporters, or (today) even the prevelance of savvy social media activists or 
propagandists. In terms of units of analysis we will look at powerful individuals, collectives 
(such as NGOs, faith-based organizations, trade unions), and countries. It is important to note 
that individuals or groups who obey a system to which they are ideologically opposed are 
nonetheless classified as human resources propping up the target regime, therefore black South 
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African laborers and leaders of bantustans who were complicit in supporting the segregationist 
policies of the apartheid regime would be classified as human resources supporting it.  
Any attempt to measure this pillar of power quantitatively or qualitatively is difficult, so 
in order to operationalize this pillar for numerical comparison, it will be helpful to define the two 
extremes that are possible. A score of ‘1’ will represent a situation in which 100% of the human 
resources who have a stake in the conflict are actively working (whether coerced or uncoerced 
and regardless of their level of contentedness) to maintain the political, social, and economic 
arrangement which keeps the target regime in its position of power and are highly 
knowledgeable and skilled in achieving that goal. A score of ‘0’ will represent a situation in 
which no individuals, groups, or institutions who actively work to support the target regime, and 
all of the individuals, groups, and institutions are actively working against it, which would 
represent a state in which the regime no longer ceases to function and therefore collapses. 
Myriad combinations exist between these two extremes, and (although admitedly imperfect in 
terms of measurement), a rationale for the scores received by each of the target regimes during 
the periods under study will be made during the examination of the results in the next two 
chapters.  
 
Pillar IV: Cohesion and Collective Purpose 
The fourth pillar is comprised of multiple intangible factors, which Sharp classifies as 
“psychological and ideological factors, such as habits and attitudes toward obedience and 
submission, and the presence or absence of a common faith, ideology, or sense of mission.”61 
Given the vagueness of Sharp’s original classificatory scheme, however, my examination of this 
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pillar borrows from the work of Pearlman’s concepts of “cohesion” and “collective purpose,” 
which she defines respectively as “the cooperation among individuals that enables unified 
action”62 and “the extent to which a population agrees on clear objectives . . . [across] social, 
economic, and other cleavages,” which she argues is “the ultimate guarantor of a movement’s 
cohesion because it guarantees the movement itself.”63 For the cases under study, the pillar of 
cohesion will be operationalized as the extent to which the supporters of the target regime remain 
unified by a shared faith, ideology, personality traits, or beliefs in relation to the cohesion and 
collective purpose of those who are aligned against it. This may be measured by using survey 
and census data regarding the beliefs and attitudes of the supporters of the target regime or 
decisions made by groups and institutions that reflect shifting beliefs and opinions about the 
target regime’s policies. An example of this type of power would be the degree of unity within 
Israeli society about the future of the occupied territories. Pearlman explains how this translates 
into power by arguing that “leaders can explicity invoke ideas that resonate with people’s shared 
identities and interests, and thereby bolster unity in the struggle for goals that they hold in 
common,” which allows them to “leverage popular backing to isolate and thwart rivals, which 
may consolidate their authority and control.”64 Statements from faith-based organizations or 
institutions outside the country (such as the Anglican Church’s opposition to apartheid or 
institutional investors creating policies barring investments in South African companies) would 
also serve as evidence of the level of support for these intangible factors that prop up the target 
regime. Similar to the other pillars, a score of ‘1’ will represent a situation in which the 
psychological and ideological beliefs underpinning the target regime’s authority are completely 
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in harmony with those of their supporters and there exists strong cohesion and collective sense of 
purpose, while a ‘0’ represents a situation in which a target regime’s legitimacy is completely 
bankrupt and the cohesion and collective purpose is entirely on the side of those who are aligned 
against the target regime.  
 
Pillar V: Material Resources  
Material resources make up the fifth pillar, which Sharp defines as “the degree to which 
the [regime] controls property, natural resources, financial resources, the economic system, 
means of communication, and transportation.”65 Using this definition, this pillar will be 
operationalized as the relative levels of property ownership, ownership of natural resources, 
military and defense equipment, levels of income and shares of GDP, control of communications 
technologies like radio, television networks, and internet access, and access to roads and control 
over freedom of movement, respectively. Externally, the degree to which material and monetary 
support flows into the country through investments, loans, weapons sales, and technological 
support (such as IBM computers utilized in implementing South Africa’s Pass Laws) to the 
target regime by international businesses and institutions also represent material resources. By 
necessity, the strength of this pillar is relative to the strength of those who are opposed to the 
regime, and therefore a score of ‘1’ would represent a situation in which 100% of the control of 
material resources is in the hands of the target regime and its supporters, while a score of ‘0’ 
would represent a situation in which 100% of the control of material resources is in the hands of 
its opponents. It is important to distinguish here that shifts in the levels of intangible factors 
underpinning the target regime’s sources of power may result in a shift in the levels of material 
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resources at its disposal, as in the case of South Africa’s inability to gain access to the 
international bond market after many institutional investors caved to the demands of the anti-
apartheid movement and divested from the country. The loss of the loans necessary to maintain 
South Africa’s ability to repay its debts is a loss of material support, but demonstrates the 
symbiotic relationship between the intangible factors and material support for the target regime.  
 
Pillar VI: Sanctions 
Finally, sanctions make up the sixth potential source of power, which Sharp explains are 
“an enforcement of obedience used by rulers against their subjects to supplement voluntary 
acceptance of their authority and to increase the degree of obedience to their commands.”66 
These sanctions may be used against the regime’s own population or other countries/powers. To 
the degree that other countries and institutions are complicit in these sanctions or help to enforce 
them, we can operationalize this pillar by providing examples of the types of sanctions that may 
be utilized, which Sharp explains include “the breaking of diplomatic relations, economic 
embargoes, military invasions and bombings. . . . imprisonment or execution, . . . conventional 
war, strikes, political noncooperation and boycotts.”67 A score of ‘1’ would represent a situation 
in which there is complete enforcement of compliance with the sanctions enacted or put in place 
by the target regime, and a score of ‘0’ would represent total noncompliance with the sanctions it 
enacts, both by those NVR opponents of the target regime and by those responsible for carrying 
out the target regime’s sanctions. A ‘0’ may also represent a complete lack of willingness on the 
part of the targe regime to use sanctions in enforcing obedience. As an example, complete 
obedience of South African Pass Laws on the part of whites and blacks within South Africa (both 
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in enforcing the laws on the part of the military and police and in carrying passes at all times on 
the part of all South African non-whites) would represent 100% internal adherence to sanctions, 
while the total refusal to obey with these sanctions (regardless of the resulting punishments) on 
the part of blacks would represent leverage exercised against those sanctions, or partial leverage 
exerted against the target regime. However, only when institutions like the police and military 
defect and refuse to enforce the sanctions of the target regime do we see what Chenoweth and 
Stephan term “loyalty shifts,” which represent “systematic breakdowns in the execution of a 
regime’s orders.”68 Additionally, they argue that “harsh crackdowns against nonviolent 
campaigns may backfire, a process that occurs when an action is counterproductive for the 
perpetrator. . . . [and] creates a situation in which the resistance leverages the miscalculations of 
the regime to its own advantage, as domestic and international actors that support the regime 
shift their support to the opposition because of specific actions taken by the regime.”69 In this 
way, enforcement of sanctions that are viewed as illegitimate or at odds with the ideological 
beliefs of the target regime’s supporters (domestically and internationally) may, in turn, 
influence the pillars of intangible factors and authority propping up the target regime internally 
and/or externally.  
Before moving to a summary of each of these pillars, it is worth pausing to note that 
while other countries may issue sanctions against the target regime, it is the effect of those 
sanctions which matter in determining how they undercut the regime’s pillars of power. For 
instance, economic sanctions against South Africa actually targets the apartheid regime’s pillar 
of material support. However, the U.S. providing cover for Israel on the U.N. Security Council 
actually helps prop up that country’s ability to enact sanctions by shielding it from penalties. 
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Because of the potential for confusion in terminology, I will be using the terms “coercion” and 
“coercive techniques” to refer to what Gene Sharp labels “sanctions” for the duration of the 
paper. We turn now to a summary of our independent variables and their operationalization. 
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Summary of Independent Variables 
Having operationalized each of the independent variables, it is helpful to see them 
together with their corresponding values and the coding method I will use in examining each of 
the cases. 
Table 1. Operationalization and coding of independent variables. 
 
Pillar of 
Power 
Values Level of 
Support 
Explanation 
Authority 1 
.75 
.5 
.25 
0 
Full 
High 
Partial 
Low 
None 
§ Sole source of legitimate authority 
§ Regime legitimacy in question 
§ Authority in competition with competing source of authority 
§ Challenged and viewed as unable to govern 
§ Regime collapse 
Human 
Resources & 
Skills and 
Knowledge 
1 
 
.75 
.5 
.25 
0 
Full 
 
High 
Partial 
Low 
None 
§ 100% of population actively working to maintain the political, social, 
and economic arrangement keeping regime in power 
§ 75% working to keep regime in power 
§ 50% working to keep regime in power 
§ 25% working to keep regime in power 
§ Regime collapse 
Cohesion and 
Collective 
Purpose 
1 
. 
75 
.5 
.25 
0 
Full 
 
High 
Partial 
Low 
None 
§ Psychological and ideological beliefs underpinning regime authority 
100% in harmony with its supporters/fully cohesive 
§ 75% in harmony with its supporters/strong cohesion 
§ 50% in harmony with its supporters/partial cohesion 
§ 25% in harmony with its supporters/weak cohesion 
§ Target regime’s legitimacy completely bankrupt and cohesion and 
collective purpose is 100% on the side of those against it 
Material 1 
 
.75 
.5 
.25 
0 
Full 
 
High 
Partial 
Low 
None 
§ 100% of material resources in the hands of target regime and its 
supporters  
§ 75% of material resources in the hands of target regime/supporters 
§ 50% of material resources in the hands of target regime/supporters 
§ 25% of material resources in the hands of target regime/supporters 
§ 100% of material resources on side of target regime’s opponents 
Coercion 1 
 
.75 
.5 
.25 
 
 
0 
Full 
 
High 
Partial 
Low 
 
 
None 
§ Total enforcement of compliance with coercive techniques enacted by 
target regime and those responsible for enforcing it 
§ High enforcement of compliance, but lessening of coercion 
§ Complete noncompliance coupled with inability to enforce coercion 
§ Total noncompliance coupled with significant backfiring on the part 
of those responsible for carrying out coercion OR the non-use of 
coercive techniques against opponents (as in S.A.) 
§ Total noncompliance with coercive techniques used by target regime 
on the part of those resisting it and responsible for carrying them out  
 
Having operationalized our independent variables, we turn now to an examination of the 
dependent variable of campaign success. 
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Dependent Variables 
We must also conceptualize and operationalize the dependent variable –NVR Success–
and its three component values: complete success, partial success, and failure. Following 
Chenoweth and Stephan, I classify “success” as consisting of  “the full achievement of [a 
campaign’s] stated goals (regime change, antioccupation, or secession) within a year of the peak 
of activities,” with the necessity that the campaign have a “discernible effect on the outcome.”70  
It is important to note that a campaign may last days, months, or even years. In the case 
of South Africa, those goals would be the ones that were identified very early on and, in 1955, 
written into the ANC’s Freedom Charter, which articulated in very clear language a vision for 
South Africa of total political equality for all races and the right to vote “for every man and 
woman” in the country.71 Massie argues that this key event served as a way to bring together “a 
politically, racially, and economically diverse group of South Africans and [unite] them in their 
opposition to the National government’s program of apartheid,” which, he explains, “became a 
sort of creed for the next generation of anti-apartheid activists.”72 As previously stated, the goal 
for Palestinians would be some form of self-determination and/or equal representation for the 
Palestinian people (whether through a two or one-state solution) and a just and acceptable 
resolution of the issues of settlements, land expropriation, control of natural resources, and the 
right of refugees to return to their homeland.73 Partial success is defined as the achievement of 
some of the stated goals of the NVR campaign within a year of the peak of activities, and failure 
is the inability to achieve any of the stated goals of the NVR campaign. 
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Additionally, I believe that an NVR campaign must either have leverage against the 
target regime’s pillars of power or enlist the help of external actors in targeting those pillars in 
order for it to achieve strategic success, which I will articulate below in my hypotheses. Schock 
defines leverage as “the ability of contentious actors to mobilize the withdrawal of support from 
opponents or invoke pressure against them through the networks upon which opponents depend 
for their power.”74 For this study, leverage is conceptualized as the ability of the NVR campaign 
to do battle against the individual pillars of power upon which the target regime rests. The puzzle 
can best be understood as a challenge in determining what combination of leverage applied 
against pillars of power internally and externally lead to the possible changes in outcomes in the 
dependent variable: NVR campaign success. If an NVR campaign were able to apply leverage 
against each of the target regime’s pillars of power simultaneously, there would exist ten 
independent variables, outlined below in Figure 2. 
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Fig. 1. List of Independent and Dependent Variables and Values. 
 
 
Having defined my independent and dependent variables, I will now explain my hypotheses for 
how I believe these variables interact. 
 
Hypotheses 
In attempting to understand the role of external support (or lack thereof) for the target 
regime as an independent variable (IV) impacting the success or failure of NVR campaigns as a 
dependent variable (DV), the following hypotheses will guide my study: 
Hypothesis 1: The less great power external support for the target regime, the greater strategic 
success of an NVR campaign. 
Internal	  Independent	  
Variables	  
I.V.	  1	  -­‐	  Internal	  
Leverage	  against	  
Authority	  
I.V.	  2	  -­‐	  Internal	  
Leverage	  against	  
Human	  Resources	  &	  
Skills	  and	  Knowledge	  
I.V.	  3	  -­‐	  Internal	  
Leverage	  against	  
Cohesion	  and	  
Collective	  Purpose	  
I.V.	  4	  -­‐	  Internal	  
Leverage	  against	  
Material	  Resources	  
I.V.	  5	  -­‐	  Internal	  
Leverage	  against	  
Coercion	  
External	  Independent	  
Variables	  
I.V.	  6	  -­‐	  External	  
Leverage	  against	  
Authority	  
I.V.	  7	  -­‐External	  
Leverage	  against	  
Human	  Resources	  &	  
Skills	  and	  Knowledge	  
I.V.	  8	  -­‐	  External	  
Leverage	  against	  
Cohesion	  and	  
Collective	  Purpose	  
I.V.	  9	  -­‐	  External	  
Leverage	  against	  
Material	  Resources	  
I.V.	  10	  -­‐	  External	  
Leverage	  against	  
Coercion	  
Dependent	  
Variable	  Values	  
Full	  Achievement	  of	  
political	  goals	  &	  
objectives	  
Partial	  Achievement	  of	  
political	  goals	  &	  
objectives	  
Failure	  to	  achieve	  
political	  goals	  &	  
objectives	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Hypothesis 2: The increased external pressure/costs on the target regime, the greater strategic 
success of an NVR campaign. 
These hypotheses will be tested by examining the degree to which external support exists for 
each of the target regimes in both of the cases and examining each of the pillars and measuring 
the effect this support has (if any) on the ability of each respective NVR campaigns to achieve 
strategic success. It may be found that the null hypothesis is true (that is, that external support or 
lack thereof has no bearing on the outcome of an NVR campaign). These hypotheses are 
falsifiable; as it may be determined that South African NVR was successful solely because of the 
external leverage applied against the apartheid regime. On the other hand, an analysis of South 
African NVR which reveals that internal NVR withdrawals of support from the human resources 
of the target regime through internal and international boycotts, work stoppages, and similar 
tactics were more responsible for the collapse of the apartheid regime would mean that 
Palestinian NVR would be even more dependent upon the withdrawal of international support 
for the target regime and international sanctions against the Israeli government in order to 
achieve strategic success due to the Palestinians’ lack of leverage against the human resources 
pillar of Israeli power due to the fact that the Israeli regime does not depend upon Palestinian 
labor in the same way that the apartheid regime depended upon the labor of black South Africans. 
The distance between the imposition of international sanctions and corresponding changes (or 
lack thereof) in regime behavior in addition to historical and autobiographical analysis will aid in 
the understanding of what pillars matter more (or most) when an NVR campaign attempts to do 
battle.  
 Having outlined the hypothesized causal relationship between variables, we turn now to 
an examination of elements of control that the selection of these two cases provides.  
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Control Variables 
As George and Bennett maintain, the problem of “too many variables and too few cases” 
may be resolved by finding “sufficiently comparable cases that provide the functional equivalent 
of experimental control.”75 Due to the strong existence of control mechanisms76 between these 
two cases and the use of process-tracing in the research it will be possible to guard against 
underdetermination.77 South Africa and Israel/Palestine provide a very clear comparison of most 
similar cases that vary on the dependent variable (success versus partial success) and control for 
a variety of other potentially confounding variables.78 Both are former British settler colonies 
(with elements of British common law present in each) with a history of colonization by an 
external minority that became the dominant oppressive group (Afrikaners of Dutch descent in 
South Africa and Jews in Israel).79 Both conflicts are nativist versus settler conflicts as both 
groups (Afrikaner whites in South Africa and Zionist Jews in Israel) fought for the ability to 
control their respective countries to the exclusion of other ethnic and racial groups, citing divine 
right as justification.80 The two cases differ somewhat in terms of how the regimes were 
established, however, in that in the case of South Africa, whites fought a war with the British 
(the Boer War) and reluctantly accepted British rule after having already fought a colonization 
war with the local inhabitants.81 In the case of Israel, Zionism had the initial support of the 
British government from the beginning of what leading Zionists at the time explicitly labeled 
their “colonization” of Palestine. However, due to the desire of the Dutch and Jewish settler 
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communities in South Africa and Israel, respectively, British support for both regimes was 
unable to continue long past World War II, and both became newly independent former British 
colonies after this period of time.82  
In both cases, Afrikaners and Israelis quickly consolidated power and established their 
autonomy after becoming independent from their colonial powers while simultaneously denying 
those same rights of self-determination for many of the inhabitants of those countries, which they 
came to dominate politically, economically, and socially.83 In the case of both countries, British 
decolonization played a role in allowing the minority to assume control in the absence of British 
oversight, however guerilla tactics were used more successfully by the Israelis to gain 
independence, while South Africa was a case of a less violent devolution of power from Britain 
to the white minority government.84 Both groups pursued a similar path of denying rights to the 
new “minority” groups (non-whites and Palestinians), although to different degrees. Whites and 
Israelis also share a common fear of allowing equal representation of the entire population; both 
cite(d) the likelihood that they would become marginalized and that reverse oppression and 
discrimination would take place.85  
Another commonality is the presence of radical flanks. Scholars are divided over the 
effects of radical flanks, which are defined as contemporaneous violent actors who have the 
same or similar political objectives as their nonviolent counterparts.86 In the case of South Africa, 
resistance took the form of both nonviolent and violent methods to subvert control of the 
majority power (i.e. apartheid regime) via the African National Congress (ANC) and its armed 
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wing, the Umkhonto we Sizwe (or MK). While the MK limited their campaigns to acts of 
sabotage against material resources of the apartheid regime, Poqo (the armed wing of the Pan-
African Congress) was much more militant and directed its efforts towards terrorizing those in 
the white community. Similar developments occurred in Palestine with regard to the PLO and 
subordinate paramilitary organizations, particularly modern-day terrorist groups like Hamas.87 
These parallel cases will therefore allow us to control for the effects of violent radical flanks 
using terrorism to achieve their goals and objectives. 
Nonviolence was used unsuccessfully (for long periods of time) in both countries as well 
before the NVR campaigns achieved strategic success. This is important because time is a 
potentially confounding variable that can be controlled by comparing both cases. In South Africa, 
the Defiance campaign of the 1950s preceded armed resistance against the apartheid regime, but 
ultimately failed until NVR efforts were revived to similar levels much later in the 1980s.88 
Similarly, Michael Broning points out that, contrary to popular opinion, Palestinian NVR has a 
long tradition in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as “[d]ecades of oppression have been countered 
not first and foremost by violent responses but by a struggle that for most Palestinians for most 
of the time has been largely free of violence.”89 
Perhaps most significantly, both cases have been framed as antiapartheid struggles by 
their respective NVR campaigns, providing a unique opportunity for comparison whereby two 
groups with the same idiosyncratic goals can be compared. In the case of South Africa, the 
system of racial inequality and separation allowed the apartheid regime to maintain power and 
deny black South Africans self-determination by denying them voting rights and attempting to 
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silence political dissent. The AAM arose to counter these policies and is an example of a 
successful NVR campaign that achieved its political goals.90  
Israeli policies have increasingly paralleled South Africa’s, most notably the building of 
the separation barrier walling off settlements in the West Bank and allowing for special access to 
certain regions of the territory for Israeli citizens while restricting or denying the same access to 
Palestinians. Israel has also curtailed many of the rights of Palestinian people, including the 
withholding of state funding for education in the absence of adopting Israeli standards of 
bilingualism or due to the inclusion of a Palestinian national narrative, immigration quotas 
(which are exclusively given to Jewish immigrants and denied to Palestinians), continued 
settlement construction (at the expense of Palestinian private property), and the inability to 
vote.91 Ending this type of separation was the explicit goal of South Africans and has been cited 
by Palestinian leaders Edward Said and Mustafa Barghouthi as the explicit goal of their own 
struggle, however it must be admitted that the South African goal of accomplishing this through 
creating a fully democratic state and a change in regime throughout the entire country does differ 
from the Palestinian goal of “shaking off” Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip and 
establishing a state, a potential alternative hypothesis which I will also investigate.92   
 Another key variable that the conflicts share is a support for the target regime by great 
powers. In the case of South Africa, U.S. support for the apartheid regime existed for a long time 
after racial norms of equality had come into force in the U.S. but changed dramatically in a short 
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period of time.93 In the case of Israel, U.S. support during the period of time under examination 
remained strong, and provides a key test for the question of whether, and/or when, external 
support for the NVR campaign or withdrawal of support from the target regime are, in fact, key 
independent variables that play a role in determining the success, partial success, or failure of 
NVR campaigns. It must be noted, however, that two key potentially confounding independent 
variables may exist given that these cases differ regionally (Middle East versus Sub-Saharan 
Africa) and culturally (including racial/ethnic groups and religious beliefs), which may mean that 
different strategic interests of the U.S. come into play that are not observed by this comparison. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we will control for the effects of time. Each case 
will be examined during the same time period, beginning with the point in time where U.S. 
policy began its divergence in terms of its attitude towards the two respective cases. The best 
starting point for this is with the inauguration of President John F. Kennedy, whose “four-
pronged approach” to Africa included supporting Africans’ push for freedom and independence 
for African nations, but essentially exempted South African blacks.94 The Kennedy 
Administration is an appropriate starting point for both cases, given that his administration set 
the tone in both instances, in many ways, for the duration of each case. At one point, Kennedy 
demonstrated clearly the degree to which he understood the interplay of domestic and 
international affairs by asking his informal African advisor, Barbara Ward Jackson, “whether 
Africa could become an issue in American politics on par with the Israeli issue with the Jewish 
vote.”95 The time period under investigation, then, will be from 1961 through 1994. This will 
allow for a greater degree of control given that the same decision-makers are in power, therefore 
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controlling as much as possible for any variation in the international geopolitical landscape or the 
individual personalities of world leaders during this time. Additionally, this time period includes 
the height of activities for both NVR campaigns as well as the successful and partial 
achievement of both campaigns’ stated objectives. This time period also allows time for an 
examination of the aftermath of both cases. Process-tracing of all external variables (e.g. U.N. 
Security Council Resolutions, BDS campaign activities, economic sanctions, diplomatic support 
for NVR campaigns or against target regime, etc.) during this time period will help paint a 
picture of the cause and effect of the external leverage applied to each target regime and examine 
the resulting change (or lack thereof) in the target regime’s behavior. Having established the 
rationale and logic of comparison, we turn now to the methodology.  
 
Methodology 
Due to the complex interplay of a plethora of individuals, groups, institutions, states, and 
international organizations, process-tracing through a historical analysis of the events leading up 
to the end of the apartheid regime’s rule in South Africa and the partial achievement of 
Palestinian political objectives in the First Intifada is the most useful comparative tool to explore 
these two cases. Process-tracing is a process whereby historical research is examined in order to 
determine “whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact 
evidence in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case.”96 This method is 
valuable because it allows us to “get closer to the mechanisms or microfoundations behind 
observed phenomena”97 and can be used to “focus on whether the variable of interest was 
causally linked to any change in outcome and to assess whether other independent variables that 
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change over time might have been causal,” making it the most appropriate tool to use for this 
comparison.98 In this way it will be possible to determine why South African NVR was able to 
fully achieve that movement’s stated objectives and why Palestinian NVR fell short, as well as 
gain insight into what variables are potentially causal or interacting (e.g. international economic 
pressure coupled with loss of great power support) in predicting NVR success.  
Process-tracing will be used to fashion a “natural” time-series experiment, which Chris 
Fife-Schaw explains consists of “taking measurements of the dependent variable on three or 
more occasions.”99 The dependent variables in question would be the fully successful 
achievement of the political objectives sought by the South African NVR campaign and the 
partial achievement of the Palestinian NVR campaign’s stated objectives. In order to fashion a 
time-series that will illuminate the effects of leverage applied against each of the target regimes 
during the period under study, it is necessary to investigate the strength of the target regime’s 
pillars of power at multiple points during the period under study. Each pillar will be examined at 
four points (1961, 1971, 1981 and 1991) to determine the effects of internal and external 
leverage applied to the target regime on the strength of the regime’s individual pillars of power at 
identically spaced intervals in each case. While these are necessarily estimates of the strength of 
the regime’s power, visual approximations and ratings will be created to help understand the 
degree to which the NVR campaign is able to attack or undercut the pillars of power of both 
regimes and tell the story of how the mix of independent variables eventually led to the 
successful achievement (or partial achievement in the case of Israel/Palestine) of the dependent 
variable. Through this historical analysis, we will also examine the decision-making process of 
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those in power in the respective target regimes. By analyzing the target regimes and its leaders 
within a given period of time, holding the internal independent variables constant, and examining 
the external independent variables, it will be possible to determine the key causal variable(s) that 
are responsible for changes, or lack thereof, in the target regime’s behavior.  
Inferring causality, then, becomes a question of investigating the degree to which external 
factors simultaneously withdrawing support for the South African regime’s pillars of power 
contributed to the collapse of that country’s apartheid regime and comparing the result to the 
degree to which external factors played a role in the partial achievement of the Palestinian NVR 
campaign’s stated objectives. By examining which variables are present and which are lacking, it 
will be possible to draw conclusions about the potential causality of those variables and how they 
interact with one another. 
The bulk of the comparison, therefore, lies in the relationship of great powers to the 
target regimes. While Palestine continues to be recognized by a significant number of countries 
around the world, these countries have little to no impact on Israeli policy. While South Africa’s 
apartheid regime was tolerated for a long while (diplomatically speaking), Israel benefits from its 
“special relationship” to the United States, which has its roots in Kennedy’s wooing of Jewish 
voters in his first (successful) bid for the presidency in 1960.100 In contrast with South Africa, 
Mearsheimer and Walt point out that, prior to the Israel lobby, “no lobby has managed to divert 
U.S. foreign policy as far from what the American national interest would otherwise suggest, 
while simultaneously convincing Americans that U.S. and Israeli interests are essentially 
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identical.”101 This provides us with a clear divergence of great power support between the two 
cases that we can examine to determine the effect it has on the dependent variable. Finally, the 
unique situation in Palestine as an opposition that is more dependent on the State of Israel than 
Israel is on the Palestinians make this case worthy of comparison with South African NVR. 
Chenoweth and Stephan argue that “in situations in which there is an inverse economic 
dependency relationship . . . it may be difficult for a civil resistance campaign to achieve 
significant leverage without working through parties with closer political and economic ties to 
the state,” a situation which they apply to the case of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.102  
The comparison of these two cases is useful because, before economic sanctions were 
enacted, South Africa was uniquely positioned as an “economic hegemony, despite almost 
universal non-recognition of their legitimacy. It was a pariah of international diplomacy, yet 
economically . . . was well integrated into the Western system.”103 It remains to be seen, however, 
whether the true causal variable is economic. Because the NVR campaign in South Africa was 
eventually able to achieve full integration and peacefully take over the military and political 
apparatus left over by the apartheid regime in 1994, the bulk of the decision to yield to the 
demands of the black community (and international community) lie principally in the minds of 
the decision-makers. In order to determine which variable was primarily responsible, it will be 
necessary to determine what drove their decision-making process, meaning that the overarching 
question for each case will be what leaders did in response to the withdrawal of support for their 
regimes and the leverage applied against them and an examination of their reasoning behind 
those actions. Historical and autobiographical literature will therefore be examined to determine 
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the extent to which individuals attribute their reasoning to internal and external situations.104 
Both examinations will also utilize the methodology of qualitative historical analysis to inform 
the process-tracing examination by analyzing historical primary and secondary source materials 
to fashion a time-series analysis that examines each independent variable’s impact on the 
trajectory of the NVR campaign’s ability to achieve its political goals.105  
The primary units of analysis of each target regime’s decision-making process will merge 
the bureaucratic, sociological, and psychological lenses106 in order to capture as complete of a 
picture as possible, thus illuminating how NVR alters the decision-making process of target 
regimes in other cases of NVR. Moreover, as Bar-Tal argues, changes in societal beliefs for 
countries locked in what he classifies as “intractable conflicts” requires a change of beliefs, most 
often brought about by “changes perceived in the conflict situation,” such as shifting 
“geopolitical or economic” conditions.107 Additionally, alternative hypotheses (such as the 
presence or absence of charismatic leadership) will be examined to determine what impact (if 
any) they had on the target regime’s behavior. 
 
Goals of this study 
What follows is a focused, structured comparison of the two cases in question, beginning 
with an outline of each NVR campaign’s political goals and objectives, a summary of the 
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political landscape, an examination of any potentially confounding variables that could yield 
substantial differences in dependent variable outcomes, and then a detailed timeline of each case 
that focuses on each external independent variable and the impact it has on the NVR campaign’s 
strategic success, partial success, or failure. What I seek to contribute to the field of research is 
an analytical explanation of the causal factors at work in order to empirically determine when it 
is necessary to enlarge the NVR battlefield and seek out third-party engagement. George and 
Bennet classify an analytic explanation approach to process-tracing as one which “converts a 
historical narrative into an analytical causal explanation couched in explicit theoretical forms.”108 
This is useful because each of these variables are interacting variables, in that they are not 
independent of each other, therefore this approach provides an opportunity “to inductively 
identify complex interaction effects.”109 This goal of this study, then, is to provide a stepping 
stone towards better understanding of the role external players can have in helping NVR 
campaigns achieve their political goals and objectives both in the abstract and in a current, 
ongoing conflict in which the U.S. plays a key role. An examination of the potential implications 
for U.S. policy will follow in the conclusion. 
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Chapter III: The Case of the South African NVR Campaign 
This chapter analyzes the NVR campaign in South Africa, beginning with the Defiance 
Campaign in 1952,110 and which eventually was successful in bringing about the end of apartheid 
and culminated in the election of the first democratically-elected President of South Africa, 
Nelson Mandela, in 1994. Before exploring each of the individual pillars, it is important to recall 
the dependent variable established by the NVR campaign. For the South African anti-apartheid 
movement (or AAM), the dependent variable was established very early on by the African 
National Congress (ANC) at Kliptown, where on June 26, 1955, over three thousand delegates 
representing a diverse cross-section of South Africans gathered to establish a vision of a South 
Africa that was diametrically opposed to the apartheid regime’s goal of a racist, white-dominated 
state.111 Their Freedom Charter preamble states that “We, the people of South Africa, declare for 
all our country and the world to know that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and 
white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of the 
people.”112 Most importantly, this charter set forth a vision in which “every citizen had one vote, 
regardless of color, and where complete political equality existed regardless of race, color, or 
creed.”113  
 This vision remained the unwavering goal of the ANC, which became the primary 
opposition to the apartheid regime, but also of other organizations and NVR movements both 
inside and outside of South Africa. Outside South Africa, organizations such as churches, 
institutions of higher education, and state and local governments saw the debate over apartheid 
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as one in which they had both a stake and a role in effecting change largely due to the efforts of 
NVR activists outside of the country of South Africa. It is often true in the case of South Africa 
that changes in one pillar do not occur in isolation, and one example of the type of chain reaction 
that NVR activism can (and did) take place in this conflict would be the increase in the spread of 
NVR demonstrations on college campuses. This led to discomfort on the part of higher education 
boards of directors, which in turn led to a shift in the attitudes of institutional investors and 
therefore a weakening of the material strength of the apartheid regime through the withdrawal of 
companies who were previously doing business in South Africa, thus weakening the target 
regime’s pillar of material resources. For this reason it is best to trace the impact of NVR 
activism within each pillar internally and externally in order to determine whether or not there 
was any change in the individual strength of each pillar. Then we will look at the presence or 
absence of the dependent variable (achievement of the NVR movement’s goals and objctives) at 
each point in time in order to get an idea of which pillar proves to be more (or most) causal. 
 
Pillar I: Authority 
Authority, as stated in chapter two, is operationalized internally as the degree to which 
the country’s population (or areas over which the target regime claims to exercise authority) 
recognizes the regime’s legitimacy and externally as the extent to which other countries and 
international organizations recognize the target regime’s sovereignty and authority in 
international relations between states.  A score of ‘1’ represents a regime that is viewed as the 
sole source of legitimate power in the country, or “full support,” while a score of ‘0’ represents 
regime collapse (no support). The analysis of the apartheid regime in Pretoria suggests that this 
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pillar remained at “partial support” internally and “high support” externally until both dropped in 
1991 to “low support” in the final period of analysis (see Figure 2, below).   
 
Fig. 2. Levels of internal and external support for South Africa’s pillar of authority. 
 
Internally, the apartheid regime was always operating with rivalled authority. The ANC 
as an organization actually pre-dated the National Party and had fought for equality since its 
inception, representing vastly more South Africans than the apartheid regime. In terms of 
political representation, blacks in South Africa had but one voice for many years in Parliament, 
and that person was Helen Gavrosnky, a Jewish woman who became, in 1961, the sole member 
of the liberal opposition to National Party rule, a status she claimed for the next thirteen years.114 
Even her die-hard opponents, such as the pro-Nationalist editor of Die Burger (a right-wing 
paper in South Africa), acknowledged that “for one person alone to state her party’s viewpoint 
on every major item of legislation is crippling work . . . and she is doing it well.”115 This fact 
underlines, however, the complete lack of legitimate political authority that the white apartheid 
government could claim to have over the vast majority of its population, with the ANC being 
viewed by many disenfranchised South Africans as a far more legitimate regime, meaning that 
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during the entire period of time under study the apartheid regime would never achieve an internal 
authority score under this pillar greater than partial support.  
 The primary reason for the downgrading of the apartheid regime’s score from partial to 
low support in the last time-series measurement is that the apartheid regime had become 
illigitimate in the eyes of many of those in the white population it claimed to represent as well as 
not being able to effectively govern, both of which are indicators that I have outlined in the 
methodology section as indicators representing the near-collapse of the target regime. The 
regime’s widespread use of torture, particularly against white anti-apartheid activists, began to 
produce internal backfiring within the white community. By 1982 this led to “a dramatic surge in 
the number of suspicious deaths in detention . . . and at least twenty-eight [suspicious deaths] . . . 
while under the care of [South African] police.”116 This produced a significant amount of 
backfiring against the apartheid regime both internally and externally as “more than ten thousand 
people of all races” showed up for the funeral of Dr. Neil Aggett, a “twenty-eight-year-old white 
medical doctor who served as the Transvaal regional secretary of the Food and Canning Workers 
Union,” who, “according to reliable accounts… [was] so severely tortured that he became 
mentally unhinged.” 117  
 More tangible evidence of this decrease in authorty can be found in the apartheid 
regime’s own recognition of its need to be more inclusive of coloureds (those of mixed race) and 
the large Indian population living in South Africa. This led President Botha’s President’s Council 
to put forth a new constitutional plan in 1982 which would do away with the all-white Senate 
and add a House of Representatives for Coloureds and a House of Delegates for Indians, with 
each racial group theoretically being able to handle its own affairs domestically, although 
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reserving foreign policy, defense, and sports for an interracial council in which whites had a 
“distinct majority.”118 This went into effect in 1984 after “prolonged debate” in the President’s 
Council and all-white Parliament, followed by a referendum where passage was secured 
overwhelmingly by a margin of two to one amongst the all-white voting populace.119 However, it 
would not prove lasting, and the 1980s saw a continual decline in the authority of the National 
Party’s rule as President Botha increasingly was seen by white South Africans as illigetimate, 
particularly with the rise of the televised debates between he and Desmond Tutu during Ted 
Koppel’s Nightline debates in 1985 and the subsequent state of emergency declaration in the 
same year. The latter half of 1985 proved fatal to Botha’s presidency, with internal opposition 
uniting against him within the religious community, the labor and business communities, and 
even in his own National Party. Like many other events in South African history, churches led 
the way, particularly after the so-called “Kairos Document,” a statement released by the South 
African Council of Churches which “provided theological reflection on such thorny questions 
as . . . illigitimate government.”120 Politically, hard-liners on the pro-apartheid side became 
increasingly upset at what they viewed as his “soft” approach against protestors, with one neo-
Nazi member of the Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging party threatening that his own party would 
take matters into its own hands if “police failed to maintain law and order.”121 On the other side, 
the Afrikaner academic community published a document “decrying the government’s 
‘inaccurate perceptions’ of South Africa’s problems”122 that they believed Botha’s infamous 
“Rubicon speech” had portrayed, in which Botha had declared South Africa government “had 
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‘crossed the Rubicon of reform’ by accepting the permanence of Africans in the urban areas,” 
but that the “homelands [AKA Bantustans] would remain; a fourth chamber of parliament [for 
blacks] would not be ‘practical’; and Mandela would not be released unless he agreed to a set of 
restrictive conditions.”123 In the business community, fear for the loss of profit was the ultimate 
impetus behind grocery store executive Raymond Ackerman’s decision to travel with a group of 
business leaders to meet with leaders of the still-illegal ANC in Zambia in order to “demonstrate 
to the business world that South African business did not agree with apartheid.”124  Blacks were 
also beginning to flout the apartheid regime’s authority through the development of “alternative 
institutions,” such as the Organisation for Appropriate Social Services in South Africa (OASSA), 
which “effectively created a situation of dual power in South Africa.”125 Many of these 
alternative power bases united as well, including the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU), which united all unions in South Africa, as well as the United Democratic Front 
(UDF), which united all anti-apartheid organizations under one umbrella organization, officially 
adopting the Freedom Charter as its guide.126 COSATU even adopted the political goals and 
objectives of the anti-apartheid movement, openly calling for divestment and disinvestment in 
spite of the recognition that its membership would suffer. 127 Never before had so many internal 
forces arrayed against the apartheid regime been so united both in their goals and objectives. 
 All of this led to Botha’s 1986 address at the opening of Parliament which was in direct 
contradiction to his previously stated positions as he called for the “rescision of the pass laws, 
the elimination of whites-only immigration rules, and the release of all pass law violators” along 
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with the release of Mandela in exchange for the release of Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov and 
other South African soldiers being held by Angola.128 In 1989 Botha’s grip on power continued 
to wane. Realizing he had lost support of his own party, he announced that he would resign as 
leader of the National Party but remain in the office of state president.129 After the 1989 elections, 
which resulted in a fracturing of the National Party and a growth in the number of seats for the 
Conservative Party (the new official opposition party) and the more liberal Democratic Party’s 
addition of twelve seats, the new leader of the National Party, F. W. de Klerk, “interpreted the 
results as a general shift to the left” demonstrating “massive support for change [in the apartheid 
regime’s policies].”130 He immediately went about correcting what he viewed as the “excesses” 
of the Botha era by ordering police to stop using whips on protestors, granting legal permission 
for protests for the first time in decades, and releasing all of the remaining prisoners of the 
infamous Rivonia trial, with the notable exception of Nelson Mandela (although he met with him 
in person on December 13th). He also announced the end of the Separate Amenities Act, which 
was the primary tool by which the apartheid regime had enforced racial segregation since its 
inception in 1953.131   
 While these were momentous changes, they had the effect of merely affirming the 
dramatic loss of internal authority that the apartheid regime had experienced, and by 1991, our 
final year of measurement, the apartheid regime had to deal with the (now legal) ANC’s 
competing claims to exercise legitimate rule within the country, a newly released and extremely 
politically active Nelson Mandela, and widespread recognition that the apartheid regime’s days 
were numbered. Towards the end of 1991, the need to recognize its own illigitimacy was 
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confirmed by the apartheid regime when de Klerk signed the National Peace Accord with 
Mandela and Buthelezi, the leader of the KwaZulu “bantustan,” making apparent his need to 
negotiate with these competing sources of authority within South Africa, one of whom would 
take his over his office as President of a democratic South Africa in just three short years.132 
 In terms of external authority, the apartheid regime slowly lost international support as 
increasing numbers of governments around the world began to question their right to rule, 
dropping to low support in the final year under analysis. Perhaps the most potent contrast of this 
waning external recognition of the apartheid regime comes can be seen in the U.S. government’s 
complete reversal of course in their treatment of the anti-apartheid movement’s most visible 
symbol: Nelson Mandela. In 1962, under President Kennedy, “an undercover agent working for 
the American CIA, who knew where Mandela was having a secret dinner with his ANC 
colleagues and who provided the South African police with his itinerary for the following day” 
led to the arrest and imprisonment of Nelson Mandela.133 In marked contrast, on June 26th of 
1990, one year before our final year in the time period under investigation, “he became the first 
African and only the third private citizen in the history of the United States to speak before a 
joint session of Congress” after a formal greeting and reception at President Bush’s White House 
during which he felt confident enough of his position to rebuke a sitting President during a joint 
press conference.134 This event intentionally (and controversially) took place before President 
Bush formally received the newly elected President de Klerk, a clear example of the President’s 
recognition of the illigitimacy of the apartheid regime’s authority.  
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International loss of external recognition of the target regime’s authority was very 
incremental and varied widely over time, but there is a clear and observable trend that can be 
seen at multiple levels of analysis and across a diverse set of external players. At the beginning 
of the period under study, I have scored the external pillar of authority at “high support” due to 
the fact that external non-recognition of the apartheid regime was mostly limited to smaller 
countries, particularly “newly independent African nations.”135 At its early stages, the U.S. 
helped prop up the apartheid regime’s international legitimacy and recognition in spite of these 
criticisms, and the Kennedy administration (and others that followed) “opposed . . . the expulsion 
of South Africa or any other nation on the grounds that it would set a bad precedent and 
undermine the functioning of the international body.”136 The U.S. even weathered criticism from 
the U.S.S.R. over this stance, who accused them of ignoring human rights for the sake of the 
high return on U.S. investments in the country, which was by and large the case.137 At one point 
this even meant sending five Navy ships on a goodwill visit and allowing South Africa to enforce 
apartheid laws against American sailors during the sailors’ short time on shore.138  
In sharp contrast, African nations repeatedly called for the apartheid regime to be banned, 
but after losing the battle to remove South Africa from the U.N., they “surprised the West with 
[their] aggressive parliamentary tactics that led to the successful passage of limited sanctions . . . 
[and] the creation of the U.N. Special Committee on Apartheid to oversee implementation of the 
sanctions,” a clear sign of the apartheid regime’s precarious situation with regard to 
internationally recognized legitimate authority. U.S. support for the apartheid regime’s 
recognition lasted through the Reagan administration and only began to change under the Bush 
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administration. Reagan provided the most concise rationale for South Africa’s ability to maintain 
its external authority by maintaining its relationship with the most powerful nation in the world 
when he answered a question about South Africa within weeks of his inauguration by explaining 
(through a realist’s lens) that the country was one that “has stood by us in every war we have 
fought,” and which “strategically is essential to the free world in its production of minerals that 
we all must have.”139 
 While international criticism was heaped upon South Africa from a variety of sources, 
official policy remained largely unchanged in the realm of official recognition (authority) under 
a series of presidents (with some notable exceptions during the Carter administration),140 even 
during Reagan’s era of “constructive engagement” policy change under Crocker in the 1980s.141 
It is worth noting here that the belief that the ANC’s increasing number of Communists in 
leadership positions,142 coupled with the lack of any kind of domestic lobby until the late 1980s 
against the apartheid regime, allowed for the U.S. to rationalize this stance of supporting the 
apartheid regime in spite of its opposition to the regime’s racist and segregationist policies. 
Committees within Congress would at times pass legislation against the apartheid regime, but 
they would die on the floor. One Republican staff director for the Senate subcommittee on Africa 
explained that representatives felt no compulsion to support legislation due to lack of any 
“significant lobby” on the “South Africa question,” even going on to conclude that the “efforts of 
the activist community to influence the debate . . . ‘[was] nil.’”143 This lends support to the 
argument that the intangible factors, discussed below, perhaps played a very significant role in 
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forcing the one nation upon whom South Africa’s apartheid regime relied to act as domestic 
opinion began to shift, which of course it did (albeit slowly) over time. While these steps 
represent an important shift towards the eventual score change from “high support” to “low 
support” under the pillar of external authority, it is still important to note that these calls for 
change were still aimed at attempting to change the apartheid regime’s behavior, not in 
recognizing the ANC’s authority.   
The seismic change in domestic policy that began to come about as a result of domestic 
pressure became apparent when Reagan’s own Senate Republicans (Bob Dole and Charles 
Matthias) passed a bill through the Senate calling for sanctions within two years if apartheid “did 
not disappear,” which was followed up by a vote in the House of Representatives (against the 
urging of Secretary of State George Shultz) which passed 295 to 127.144 U.S. policy slowly 
began its eventual move towards partial recognition of the apartheid regime’s authority by 
“abstaining on a French Security Council resolution calling for an end to the state of emergency” 
within South Africa (as opposed to its standard practice of vetoing such measures).145 Noticeable 
changes in tone came from embattled President Reagan, who tried appointing black ambassador 
Terrence Todman as his delegate to South Africa in 1986 when it became clear that Congress 
had lost faith in his leadership over the South African issue, but Congress responded with the 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, which it passed twice, the second time with a veto-proof 
majority.146 While there may be debate about the sincerity of the measure on the part of some 
congressmen (given its exclusions of strategic minerals from the sanctions list), there is little 
doubt that the intended message was to signal Congress’ loss of their recognition of the authority 
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of the apartheid regime in Pretoria. Consequently, President Bush’s White House visit from 
Mandela and his address to a joint session of Congress in 1990 must be understood as the loss of 
South Africa’s apartheid regime’s last great power defender by the time of our final time-series 
analysis date of 1991. At a minimum, it certainly signals the that the regime’s right to rule was 
not only challenged by an opposing internal source of authority, the ANC, who openly attacked 
the target regime’s legitimacy, but was viewed as illigitimate and/or unable to effectively govern 
by a key part of the pillar of that regime’s external source of authority, the U.S. It is also worth 
noting that the same political party remains in power to this day within South Africa, and its grip 
on power has varied little since South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994.  
 An examination of the apartheid regime’s internal and external authority shows a pillar of 
authority which was always on shaky ground, but which was bolstered by the support of great 
powers (most notably the United States), which helped prop up the target regime for three 
fourths of the period of time under study, after which this pillar was close to collapsing. In 
support of my hypothesis, this analysis demonstrates convincing evidence for the importance of 
external recognition of authority of target regimes (particularly from international great powers 
like the U.S.), making this pillar a likely contributor to regime collapse when targeted effectively 
by external NVR movements. Next, we will apply the same analysis to the second and third 
(combined) pillars of human resources and the skills and knowledge of those human resources. 
 
Pillars II & III: Human Resources and Skills/Knowledge of Human Resources 
 This pillar examines the power of the human resources propping up the target regime as 
well as the skills and knowledge of those individuals and groups. A score of “full support” 
represents a situation in which the human resources and skills/knowledge of those groups and 
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individuals propping up the target regime are actively working towards the achievement of the 
goals and policies of the target regime (whether coerced or uncoerced) and/or are helping 
increase the skills and knowledge of those who are doing so. A score of “no support” represents 
a situation in which the human resources (and the skills and knowledge of those groups and 
individuals) are completely aligned against the goals and policies of the target regime. Scores in 
the middle of these two extremes represent varying levels of external support (or lack thereof) 
for the goals and policies of the target regime in question. The picture of internal and external 
support is surprisingly similar both within and outside of the country until the final period of 
analysis as outlined in Figure 3, below. 
 
Fig. 3. Levels of internal and external support for South Africa’s pillars of human 
resources/skills and knowledge. 
 
 
Zunes explains that the situation in South Africa was one in which the white minority 
population of 2.8 million (composing roughly 15% of the population) “depended upon the 
submission of the 80% non-white majority to reinforce its power sources,”147 a power dynamic 
that was solidified by the high levels of whites in the military, which by the early 1980s 
consisted of 180,000 men and over 300,000 more who could be mobilized “within a few hours” 
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due to universal (white) male conscription.148 Additionally, all white men and women were 
required to learn marksmanship at an early age.149 By 1973, these forces were led by a new army 
chief, Magnus Malan, who had graduated from the American Command and General Staff 
College in Leavenworth, Kansas in 1963, “an elite military finishing school that had trained 
everyone from Dwight D. Eisenhower and George Patton to the leaders of countless Latin 
American coups.” Just ten years later he was in Israel visiting an “old friend,” Israeli General 
Yonah Efrat (whom he had befriended during his training in Kansas) in the wake of that 
country’s most recent war, the Yom Kippur War. It was there, Polakow-Suransky explains, “that 
Malan learned the counter-insurgency techniques that helped shape his handling of the conflict in 
Southern Africa.150 
 In sharp contrast, South Africa’s black educational system was stripped from missionary 
organizations and re-designed (with the passage of the Bantu Education Bill in 1959) as a 
“strictly controlled curriculum more suitable to the requirements of a permanent underclass. . . . 
aimed at producing useful hands: there was to be no place for the black in the European 
community above the level of certain forms of labor.”151 Shortly afterwards, the Extension of 
University Education Bill banned blacks from multi-racial (but predominantly white) universities, 
which were the best ones.152 Even as late as 1986, as the government began changing some 
discriminatory policies, “school education remained strictly segregated, and in 1986 the 
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government was still spending more than seven times as much to educate a white child as to 
educate an African child.”153 
Importantly, South Africa was also supported by nearly four million blacks who lived in 
white rural areas, “labouring primarily as farm hands, [who] were so utterly dependent on their 
white overlords and geographically separated, that there was little reason to think that they would 
engage in nonviolent [or violent] resistance.”154 For this reason, internal withdrawal of the 
human resources (and the skills and knowledge of those resources) from the apartheid regime 
could be most acutely felt through strikes and work stoppages. It is worth noting here that the 
Defiance Campaign of the 1950s had ended in failure due in large part to the existence of a small, 
violent, radical flank, which (at the instigation of agents provocateurs) injected violence into 
otherwise peaceful protests, thus uniting whites against the black resistance movement.155   
 The internal support for this pillar of power varied little from the beginning of our period 
of analysis until the 1980s. After the failure of the Defiance Campaign, the apartheid regime was 
able to effectively utilize coercive techniques (with the help of the Bureau of State Security, or 
“BOSS”)156 to keep work stoppages from seriously crippling the economy (with a few notable 
exceptions), so the pillar remains at a level of high support for the period of time up to the 1970s, 
after which there was a marked increase in resistance efforts seeking to withdraw human support 
(and the skills and knowledge of those individuals) from the target regime, which became even 
more pronounced in the 1980s.  
By 1979 the government had already realized its increasing dependence on the black 
population and the danger of a higher number of strikes, which had become increasingly 
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commonplace since the Durban strikes of 1973.157 In a white paper in 1979 government officials 
admitted that “black labour represents by far the largest proportion of the total labour force . . . in 
the so-called ‘White area,’” and, perhaps more troubling to the apartheid regime, the paper 
“projected a far greater increase in the black population than for the whites.”158 The increasing 
number of strikes had a crippling effect on the South African economy, with a strike in August of 
1989 “essentially shutting down commerce in Pretoria, Johnnesberg, Durban, and East London, 
and severely crippling industry in the Western Cape.”159 The primary reason for the drop in the 
score from partial support to low support from 1981 to 1991 is the dramatic increase in the 
number of strikes and work stoppages in South Africa during the 1980s. The year of 1984, for 
example, saw the “largest of its kind” general strike in South African history, with over 800,000 
people staying home from work, which “terrified the government.”160 Similarly, in 1987, “over 
20,000 railway workers struck for over two months, and 340,000 mineworkers struck the 
Chamber of Mines for three weeks . . . [and] over 3 million person-days were lost from labour 
disputes in South Africa” in 1989.161 The strikes are most visible in the International Labor 
Organization’s (ILO) “days not worked” statistic, which takes the total number of days that a 
country loses to work stoppages and strikes that it would otherwise have been carried out by each 
worker had there been no stoppage. Going back as far as the ILO tracks this statistic to the year 
after our period of analysis yields a dramatic increase in the final years of our analysis in the 
number of work days lost due to labor shortages, as Figure 4 demonstrates. 
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Fig. 4. Days not worked due to labor stoppages, 1969-1992. Source: International Labour Organization’s 
LABORSTA Database. 
 
 
The picture that emerges, then, is one in which there was an acute withdrawal of human 
resources in the final period of time under analysis, the vast majority of which came from black 
South African laborers, particularly those working in the mining and manufacturing, which were 
South Africa’s most important industries.162 
Loyalty shifts within the white community were becoming more pronounced during this 
period of time as well. Perhaps most notably, the End Conscription Campaign (in which whites 
refused to serve in the S.A. military) experienced “dramatic growth” in the 1980s after its 
founding in 1983, particularly when “the regular armed forces moved into the black townships.” 
Zunes recounts that “as many as 1,000 new open resisters surfaced in 1989 alone, and thousands 
more evaded the draft in less public ways,” with an average of 4,000 men failing to enter the 
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service every year throughout the 1980s.163 Given the increasing reliance upon coercive 
techniques on the part of the apartheid regime in enforcing its other pillars of power, this was a 
pillar whose erosion was felt severely by the target regime, which is why the deputy defense 
minister at the time (falsely) accused it of collaboration with the ANC.164 In the end, this pillar 
has proven to be, perhaps, one of the most causal, both internally and externally, to the collapse 
of the target regime. 
 
Pillar IV: Cohesion and Collective Purpose 
 The pillar of cohesion and collective purpose examines the degree to which intangible 
factors, such as psychological and moral support for the target regime, allow it to continue its 
policies unabated and the extent to which there is cohesion and collective purpose on the side of 
the target regime or its opponents. Most easily summarized as “opinion,” shifts in intangible 
factors can be viewed as the degree to which the attitudes and beliefs of those supporting the 
regime are in agreement or opposition, particularly in relation to its policy objectives. Again, we 
can fashion a time-series with two extremes. Having “full support” for this pillar would indicate 
a strong degree of cohesion and collective purpose on the side of the target regime, while “no 
support” represents a total opposition to the belief system underpinning the target regime’s 
policies. The picture that emerges is a steady loss of the external pillar of support for the 
cohesion and collective purpose behind the target regime and a sharp decline internally in the 
final years under analysis. Figure 5 illustrates this below. 
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Fig. 5. Levels of internal and external support for South Africa’s pillar of cohesion/collective 
purpose. 
 
Externally speaking, many countries around the world were figuring out where they stood 
on their own racial issues for the entire period under study, so in 1961, South Africa was by no 
means a glaring outlier regarding the treatment of its black population. Massie captures the 
sentiment of many whites at the time who “drew from the still harrowing experience of the 
Congo and from deep psycich fears whites have always harbored about unleashed black rage.”165 
President Kennedy’s own approach has been described as two-pronged, whereby the United 
States would oppose apartheid in principle, but continue normal relationships with the country. 
In terms of political opinion, Kennedy was able to ignore the inconsistencies of such a position 
owing to the lack of “an organized domestic constituency to reward him for courage or punish 
him for duplicity.”166 It is discomfort with this cognitive dissonance, however, which began to 
slowly change the minds of those within bureaucratic institutions from attitudes of tacit approval 
of the apartheid regime’s rationale for its policies of “separate development” as being necessary 
to maintain stability within South Africa, to outright calls for change as a result of activists’ 
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NVR efforts. This situation is responsible for the steady reduction of this pillar’s score for each 
period under study, which is outlined below.  
Internally, the picture is much more nuanced, particularly on the anti-apartheid side, as 
the degree to which Verwoerd (the first South African Prime Minster after South Africa’s 
“independence” from Great Britain and a sociology professor) had socially constructed an 
equally convincing and fallaciously misleading rationale for his policy of “separate development” 
of the races within the country were persistent and hard to reverse. On the white side, Thompson 
explains that:  
the impact of the Nationlist regime on the mentality of Afrikaners was profound. 
Their language was unique, and most Afrikaners experienced little but the 
Nationalist world perspective from cradle to grave: at home, in Afrikaans-
language schools and universities, in Dutch Reformed churches, in social groups, 
on radio and television, and in books and newspapers. In particular, their schools 
imbued them with a political mythology derived from a historiography that 
distorted the past for nationalist purpose. For example, it . . . associated God with 
the victory of the Afrikaner commando over the Zulu at the battle of Blood River 
on December 16, 1838.167 
  
This mythology provided the apartheid regime with a very high degree of cohesion and 
collective purpose.  
The fragmentation that existed on the black South African side is perhaps most apparent 
in what Massie refers to as “the enigma of Buthelezi,” the Zulu leader of the KwaZulu nation 
who had gained power through acquiesence to the apartheid regime and who continued to accept 
support for the government from the beginning of his leadership of the newly created KwaZulu 
Legislative Authority in 1972 throughout the period under study.168 In 1985, support for the 
apartheid regime’s logic of keeping the races separate came increasingly from black bantu 
leaders like Buthelezi, who decried the Congress of South African Trade Union’s support for 
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disinvestment from South Africa (who knew it would harm their membership until apartheid was 
gone) and even formed his own opposing union through his Inkatha party (called the United 
Workers Union of South Africa) to oppose international sanctions against South Africa.169 His 
opposition allowed many outside South Africa to rightfully claim that many blacks within South 
Africa opposed economic sanctions on the grounds that they would lose jobs as companies left. 
Even in 1991, Massie points out, “it was revealed that Inkatha had received hundreds of 
thousands of dollars of government money to help organize antidivestment rallies,” and in direct 
opposition to the ANC’s vision of a united South Africa, Buthelezi continued to “exploit Zulu 
ethnic pride and fear with a fervor that would have pleased Verwoerd” in his attempt to maintain 
the power structure from which he had greatly benefited under many years as the recipient of the 
apartheid regime’s aid and conferral of power. His views became increasingly marginalized, but 
were the cause of much of violence between black communities within South Africa in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. 
Internally, the anti-apartheid movement began to fragment after the failure of the 
Defiance Campaign to achieve its goals in the 1950s.170 The ANC struggled to maintain its 
vision of unity not only because of bantu leaders like Buthelezi, but also in its competition with 
other organizations like the Pan-African Congress (which took a much more militant stance in its 
non-acceptance of whites in a future South Africa) and particularly with student organizations. 
The Black Consciousness movement, which is attributed to medical student turned activist, Steve 
Biko, whose organization, the South African Students’ Organization (SASO) began as “an 
exclusively black body opposed to the non-racial National Union of South African Students.”171 
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Biko “insisted on the absolute necessity for black South Africans to act for themselves, not 
relying on any support from white sympathizers who had proved ineffective allies, and to 
develop society on the basis of their own African traditions.”172 Biko and leaders of SASO were 
heavily influenced by black American thinkers, particularly Malcolm X, and as a result began to 
refer to all “nonwhites” as “blacks,” including Africans, Coloureds, and Asians who “were 
denied privileges on the basis of race under the pseudonym “Frank Talk” in his writings.173  
This pattern of disintegration and fracturing of the anti-apartheid movement (AAM) 
internally slowly reversed, and its strength was multiplied with the creation in the 1980s of the 
United Democratic Front (UDF), an umbrella organization that sought to bring together all AAM 
activists to oppose apartheid.174 Under the slogan of “The UDF Unites, Apartheid Divides,” the 
UDF was “a federation of regionally based fronts of affiliated groups,” whose “organizational 
structure made [it], in the words of its leaders, ‘more than the sum of its parts.’”175 Churches 
within South Africa, too, were reawkening to their moral obligation to speak authoritatively on 
the topic of apartheid. The greatest example of this came in the 1980s with the Harare 
Declaration, the result of a meeting between the South African Council of Churches and the 
ANC (organized by the World Council of Churches) where leaders “listened to a stirring oration 
by Desmond Tutu” and then spent the next three days discussing then approving the Harare 
Declaration. This document called upon the international community to “prevent the 
extension . . .  or renewal of bank loans” to South Africa and “urged the application of 
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‘immediate and comprehensive sanctions [against South Africa].’”176 By 1991 the majority of 
the forces who had attacked the belief system underpinning the apartheid regime’s policies were 
experiencing a rewewed sense of purpose and were largely united in opposition to apartheid on 
moral and philosophical grounds, even agreeing to a large extent in the justness of civil 
disobedience and importance of economic sanctions against South Africa in achieving their goals, 
no doubt pricking the consciences of those who continued to support the regime.  
The shifting of white opinion within South Africa was also becoming increasingly 
apparent by 1989, when even those in the Afrikaner press began to openly ask whether a 
discussion about South Africa’s future with the leadership of the ANC and a free Nelson 
Mandela was “really so unthinkable,” and in an editorial in Beeld, a leading pro-government 
newspaper columnist opined that the peace “dividends, both political and economic, such a 
discussion could deliver for our country and its whole population” were convincing reasons for 
the country to change course and talk with those whom the government had labeled “terrorists” 
for many years.177 By our final period of analysis in 1991, black and white support for the 
intangible pillars underpinning the apartheid regime were at their lowest points ever, but 
important minority groups on both sides continued to believe in them, hence the internal pillars 
of apartheid never dip below the level of low support for the period of time under study. 
Outside South Africa, the level of cohesion and collective purpose propping up apartheid 
charted a much more straightforward trajectory. Early on, few external actors were both aware of 
or concerned about the policies of apartheid. Martin Luther King, Jr. was one of the few voices 
calling for action early on, linking the struggle for civil rights within the U.S. explicitly with the 
struggle blacks faced around the world and, specifically, within South Africa. He argued as early 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176	  Massie,	  Loosing	  the	  Bonds,	  599.	  
177	  Ibid.,	  649.	  
	   63	  
as 1965 that South Africa was not immune to international pressure, but there simply was not 
any pressure to speak of, claiming that “American ‘protest is so muted . . . that it merely disturbs 
the sensibilities of the segregationists, while our trade and investments substantially stimulate 
their economy to greater heights . . . [arguing that] to ‘list the extensive economic relations of the 
great powers with South Africa is to suggest a potent non-violent path . . . a massive international 
boycott.’”178 Attitudes in the U.S., however, were continually shaped by that country’s own 
struggle with racial equality, even within the Democratic Party. Emblematic of the degree to 
which U.S. opinion was at odds with the rest of the world at this time, the winter of 1962/63 saw 
the International Court of Justice agree to hear charges brought by Ethiopia and Liberia against 
the system of apartheid within South West Africa, while later that spring U.S. Democratic 
Senator Allen J. Ellender traveled to Rhodesia and explained it was a “great mistake for the 
European colonialists to have given up control of their territories, because black Africans were 
completely incompetent,” a visit which nearly destroyed Kennedy’s African policy.179 Typical of 
company attitudes during this time period, the spokesperson for GM admitted that he had “not 
given the racial situation any thought whatsoever, either in its short-term or its long-term 
planning.”180 It would take many years, however, before many began to recognize the link that 
MLK Jr. saw and, simultaneously, to trust black South Africans to lead the country effectively. 
In spite of the emergence in 1971 of three, new at the time, socially responsible investment 
funds,181 direct and indirect investment continued over the course of the next decade. By 1979, 
however, the divestment movement began to pick up steam internationally, particularly after 
Desmond Tutu (then the President of the South African Council of Churches) was asked in the 
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same year while on a trip to Denmark whether he opposed foreign investment in South Africa in 
order to weaken the regime, to which he responded affirmatively and passionately that he did.182 
Organizations like MassDivest and the Connecticut Anti-Apartheid Committee sprang up over 
the next decade to push through divestment measures at the state and local levels. Massie traces 
the pattern of divestment from South Africa on the part of churches, universities, private and 
public institutional investors from 1971 to 1987, with Stage 0 representing “no position” on 
South African investments (which equates to no support for any type of economic sanctions 
against the apartheid regime) to Stage 10, representing “no nonequity ties or foreign firms” doing 
business with South Africa (the strictest policy approach taken by any institutional investors at 
the time), which yields the following investment pattern, summarized here in Table 2: 
Table 2. Table depicting the investment patterns of institutional investors. Reproduced from Massie.183 
 
Year Churches Universities Private Public 
1971 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1981 5.4 4.7 5.0 6.0 
1987  
(final year of data) 
9.3 9.0 7.4 8.5 
 
 
The picture that emerges is one in which institutional investors increasingly came to understand 
both the importance of their moral and ethical responsibilities as investors as well as the degree 
to which South Africa’s apartheid regime was out of sync with those values.  
This happened very slowly and incrementally, but the fact that most churches, 
universities, private and public institutional investors all came to support high levels of sanctions 
against the target regime represents a true shift in the opinions of the high-level decision makers 
in the U.S. as a result of the NVR movement’s external anti-apartheid measures. Numerous 
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examples of these efforts can be found throughout the period under study, including the 
emergence of organizations designed to put increasing pressure on these companies to fulfill 
MLK Jr.’s vision of a massive international boycott. It was churches, in fact, which began to pick 
up on MLK’s vision of international boycott, and one of the earliest groups advocating change 
was founded by an Ohio Methodist minister, George Houser, who became the first executive 
director of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), which was committed to using NVR to 
bring about racial justice. House later went on to start the American Committee on Africa 
(ACOA), designed to bring together anti-apartheid leaders all across the U.S. to “educate the 
American public about the importance of ending colonialism and white supremacy in Africa.”184 
Churches were some of the earliest advocates of the principles of ethical investing, particularly 
after the mainstream denominations of the National Council of Churches (composed of 
representatives from Methodist, Episcopal, Presbyterian and Lutheran churches) formed the 
Committee of Conscience against Apartheid in response to increasing demands from ministerial 
students to develop a moral and ethical investment policy towards South Africa.185 Much of the 
push came from U.S. activists led by Tim Smith’s organization, the Interfaith Center on 
Corporate Responsibility, which filed “a relentless stream of shareholder resolutions.”186 It is no 
accident, then, that churches were at the forefront of the divestment movement for the entire 
period under study.  
Another early and notable leader who was, in many ways, ahead of his time, was Robert 
Kennedy, who delivered a speech in South Africa (later resulting in his permanent disinvitation 
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to the country)187 where he argued against support for the apartheid regime on the basis of their 
strategic importance as an anti-communist ally by explaining that “the way of opposition to 
communism is not to imitate its dictatorship but to enlarge individual human freedom – in our 
country and around the globe. . . . The denial of communism only strengthens the very 
communism it claims to oppose.”188 In time, others would come around to this position as well. 
Institutional investment activists could be found in other settings as well, including the 
universities, non-profits, and in the public sector. The shift in thinking came also from elites, and 
the ethos, pathos, and logos of this alternative vision of corporate responsibility can be found in a 
book entitled The Ethical Investor, which argued that “investment policies can reflect an 
institution’s mission and that the ownership implied by holding stock carries with it certain 
duties . . . [among those being] a moral and legal duty to scrutinize the actions of American 
companies in South Africa.”189 The strategy of the NVR activists was designed to force these 
highly bureaucratic organizations to take institutional positions, and by the time of our final 
period of study, no major institutions wanted to be perceived as propping up what the vast 
majority of their congregants, students, clients, or citizens perceived as an unjust regime.  Some 
of the most notable efforts included the efforts of Leon Sullivan, the first black member of the 
General Motors Board of Directors, whose “Sullivan Principles” sought to pressure companies to 
put in place minimum standards for treatment of workers and equality in the workplace.190 
Intersecting the public and nonprofit sector, the Ford Foundation became much more socially 
active during the 1960s and eventually began to set the precedent for using proxy voting on 
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issues over everything from tobacco and alcohol products to racial policy in South Africa.191 
They also provided a grant to the South African Institute of Race Relations to help collect 
statistics on the effects of apartheid.192 
 Student protests flourished throughout the 1970s and 1980s, with organizations like the 
South African Solidarity Committee at Harvard193 springing up on the frontlines to attack the 
bureaucracies for what the students perceived as moral complacency and profiteering off of what 
they believed to be an obvious injustice. Typical of this pattern of protest was the 1978 “twenty-
seven-hour sit-in at Nassau Hall [at Princeton], the University’s chief administration building,” 
which led to punishment of the protestors, though they continued attacking the president, who, 
they discovered, “was moonlighting as one of the principal financial advisors to the Rockefeller 
fortune, whose holdings included more than $550 million – sixty three percent of the total – in 
companies invested in South Africa.”194 The students continued to protest and the leader of the 
student movement, Adhimu Chunga, testified before the U.N. Special Committee on apartheid, 
after which he was recognized by his peers with an annual award honoring those who had made 
the “greatest contribution to the life of the school,” which, Massie argues, “added to the 
impression that the time had come for nonprofit institutions to take new steps on South 
Africa.”195 Other nonprofits sprang up as well, such as the International Council for Equality of 
Opportunity Principles in 1978.  
By the end of our period of study, even the most vocal external proponents of the 
apartheid regime were silenced by the leading moral authority figures on the opposing side. This 
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was most visibly demonstrated when the right-wing head of the Moral Majority, Reverand Jerry 
Falwell, returned from a visit to South Africa promising to “throw the resources of the Moral 
Majority into opposing sanctions and divestment,” and claimed that he had “not met a single 
South African who favored sanctions,” even doubling down in his criticism of black South 
Africans who did favor sanctions by responding to a journalist’s question about Desmond Tutu 
that “if Bishop Tutu maintains that he speaks for the black people of South Africa, he is a 
phony.”196 Emblematic of the degree to which even the fiercest apologists of the apartheid 
regime had failed to understand how far American opinion had turned against apartheid, Falwell 
issued an apology within three days after “an avalanche of criticism.”197 As a result, external 
intangible factors decreased dramatically from high support to no support during the period of 
time under study. Much of this debate obviously played a role in the level of support for other 
pillars, but this shifting of opinion is perhaps the greatest indicator and its effect on all of the 
other pillars is hard to overestimate. A critique from de Klerk, however, is particularly relevant 
to this discussion, who argued that sanctions (particularly those against the academic 
community) “did more harm than good” by cutting off “universities, students, artists, and 
scientists” at a time when they were “ripe to become proponents of change within our own 
society.”198 His critique that these unversity boycotts strengthened the hand of apartheid 
hardliners who played up white resentment against the international community must be taken 
seriously, particularly given the extent to which loyalty shifts of populations supporting the 
target regime are more likely to lead to achievement of NVR goals and objectives.199 It is a 
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critique well worth taking into consideration given similar complaints from Israeli academics 
who view the BDS (Boycott, Divest, and Sanction) movement as bigoted and anti-Semitic.   
In the final analysis, Pearlman argues that this strengthening of cohesion on the side of 
the anti-apartheid movement both internally and externally had the effect of fragmenting those 
on the side of the apartheid regime as “exhausted by unrest and financial losses, more white 
citizens turned away from apartheid.”200 
 
Pillar V: Material Resources 
Material resources are those non-human resources that enable a regime to function and 
survive, sustain itself, and carry out its policies. It includes economic strength, weapons, and 
other tools the regime has at its disposal which allow it to carry out its policies. Internally these 
material resources may be threatened by external economic sanctions or prohibitions against the 
target regime which make it difficult to secure the resources it needs for its survival. However, it 
is the relative level of material resources that the regime has at its disposal in order to maintain 
its position of power which matters. It is worth remembering that the degree to which material 
and monetary support flows into the country through investments, loans, weapons sales, and 
technological support also represent external material resources, and under this pillar, “full 
support” would represent a situation in which 100% of the control of material resources is in the 
hands of the target regime and its supporters, while “no support” would represent a situation in 
which 100% of the control of material resources is in the hands of its opponents internally. An 
analysis of South Africa’s material resources is depicted in Figure 6, below. 
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Fig. 6. Levels of internal and external support for South Africa’s pillar of materials support. 
 
 
Stephen Zunes paints a concise picture of the state of South Africa’s internal level of 
material resources during the period under study, explaining that:  
In terms of military equipment, South Africa had an even greater advantage. The 
South African air force possessed over 875 aircraft, including over 500 combat 
aircraft and more than 200 helicopters; the army owned over 260 tanks, 1,300 
armoured cars, over 110 armoured personnel carriers, and a large number of self-
propelled medium and heavy artillery guns.201 
 
In terms of external support for this pillar of the target regime’s power, Zunes explains that: 
Until November I977, when the mandatory United Nations embargo went into 
effect, South Africa was the recipient of highly sophisticated weaponry from 
Israel, France and other countries. The embargo did not significantly alter the 
strategic balance, since a large amount of outside arms were getting into the 
country anyway, and, more importantly, South Africa had by that time become 
almost self-sufficient militarily.202 
 
This support came largely due to the effective argument that South Africa was on the “right” side 
of the Cold War and that, according to South African Ambassador Naude, the country “required 
the same help that the United States was giving to Israel, since it too was a ‘little nation which 
needed support for its survival.’”203 Internally, white South Africans were also highly armed, 
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with the per capita number of guns “among the highest in the world.”204 It is important to note 
that the ANC recognized that the preponderance of material power lay on the side of the 
apartheid regime, which was the rationale for Mandela’s Umkhonto We Sizwe (violent) sabotage 
program, which was “designed to put material pressure on the government without killing 
people.”205  
Economically speaking, South Africa’s apartheid regime also possessed “some of the 
world’s richest mineral deposits, including one-third of the earth’s known gold reserves.”206 It 
was also the only African nation with “major iron and steel industries, advanced engineering 
facilities, and petrochemical plants,” all of which “were intrinsically linked to the military 
establishment.”207 In terms of external economic support, investment in South Africa during the 
Commonwealth period increased steadily, particularly from the U.S. after World War II, nearly 
tripling to $140 million in the five years after the war ended, then jumping to $475 million in 
direct U.S. investment by 1960, the year before our period under study.208 This direct investment 
increased to nearly $1 billion by 1969, with companies like Mobil, GM, and others building 
factories in South Africa at an increasingly high rate.209 This only expanded in the years leading 
up to the imposition of sanctions in the mid-1980s, eventually amounting to:  
over $13 billion worth of annual trade between South Africa and the West, which 
combined with $30 billion in foreign investment, supplied the country with the 
vast majority of such basic commodities as transportation equipment, electrical 
equipment and machinery, nuclear technology, telecommunications facilities and 
services, computer technology, chemicals and related products, paper and 
manufactures, and other goods essential to the maintenance of South Africa as a 
modern industrialised state.” 
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South Africa was also dominant regionally in a material sense. In the words of one 
historian, their “economic leverage over the region was formidable.” Through the South African 
Customs Union, they were able to integrate Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana into their 
economy, while their railroads and ports “dominated commodity transport throughout the 
region.”210 Their military dominance also allowed them to “restrain neighboring governments 
from pursuing antiapartheid policies,” carrying out commando operations “against every one of 
its neighbors,” occupying Namibia, and carrying on its civil war in Angola.211  
In the last two decades under study, a dramatic shift in the regime’s pillar of material 
resources occurred internally and externally. Within the country, boycotts and cessation of rent 
payments had economically devastating effects.212 In 1973, for example, “150 firms were struck,” 
and in the 1980s rent boycotts led to “an estimated 60% of the black population not paying rent,” 
and by September of 1986, “forcing the government to negotiate” with local (black) township 
authorities.213 In the same year, external pressure was being placed on South Africa’s economy 
by “several major corporations [who] disinvested,” while “the U.S., Japan, Canada, and several 
European countries enacted economic sanctions against the country,” which, when coupled with 
“international bankers [refusal] to roll over new loans . . . led South Africa into the economic 
crisis which forced many of the country’s elites to advocate change.”214 This period of time was 
formative for the country’s future (and final) president during the apartheid regime, F.W. de 
Klerk, whose ministerial career coincided with the height of the AAM’s efforts to withdraw 
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pillars internally and externally from the target regime during the 1980s. It is telling how he 
downplays the impact of external sanctions designed to undercut the apartheid regime’s material 
sources of power in his biography. In discussing the impact of these sanctions imposed 
externally, he explains that, ironically, they often had the opposite intended impact because “for 
the most part South Africa succeeded in circumventing sanctions, either through import 
substitution or the adoption of sophisticated sanctions-busting strategies,” pointing to the arms 
embargo as the impetus for South Africa’s armaments industry, the oil embargo leading to the 
“most effective oil from coal industry,” and stockpiling which he claims would keep South 
Africa afloat during a boycott for up to four years.215 De Klerk also downplays the effect of 
“disinvestment by foreign multinational companies,” arguing that, “more often than not, 
[disinvestment] enabled white South African managers to buy out the local subsidiaries at 
bargain prices.” These managers, who were “no longer constrained by American and European 
employer codes of conduct . . . continued to produce exactly the same products, sometimes on a 
more profitable basis,” which he argues is probably not what the AAM “had had in mind” when 
advocating divestment.216  
Agreeing with de Klerk, economists Teoh, Welch, and Wazzan argue that the boycott of 
South Africa’s apartheid regime “had no discernible effect on the valuation of banks and 
corporations with South African operations or on the South African financial markets.”217 Their 
argument, however, fails to take into the broader macroeconomic considerations of the impact of 
the movement on South Africa’s financial system. They explain that their article “attempts to 
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quantify only the financial markets’ responses to the political pressure, not the ‘real’ 
macroeconomic responses,” which were considerable. As a result they fallaciously conclude that 
“evidence from both individual and legislative actions, taken together, suggests that the South 
African boycott had little valuation effect on the financial sector.”218  
Massie’s method of process-tracing the broader macroeconomic impact of activist 
investment policies is more convincing. He describes the tenuous position of the South African 
macroeconomy in 1985, which was dogged by high inflation, low exports and consumer 
spending, and a growing recessionary trend, all of which required increasingly higher loans 
(whose term lengths international lenders were slowly but steadily decreasing) until it had racked 
up “thirty-four billion rand in short-term obligations, making up 57% of its total foreign debt.”219 
Two weeks before the infamous “Rubicon speech,” a crisis emerged when Chase Manhattan 
(after pressure from New York City and activists to cut off South Africa’s loans) decided it 
“would not roll over its $500 million loan to South Africa, but instead ask for repayment,” 
leading to “global equivalent of a bank run” on the South African financial system as other banks 
did the same, causing the Rand to plummet to thirty-four cents to the dollar.220 Concurring with 
his macroanalysis, Thompson explains that “the government’s problems were compounded by a 
deteriorating economic situation, engendered in large part by the political uncertainty and the 
withdrawal of foreign investment. . . . [as a result] inflation rose from 11 percent in 1983 . . . to 
18.6 percent in 1986 . . . [while] real growth per capita declined in 1985 and 1986. . . . [while] 
[u]nemployment was rising continuously.”221 Unlike in 1982, when Reagan’s intervention at the 
IMF led them to continue loans to South Africa over U.N. objections, this time pressure brought 
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to bear on the central bankers themselves made them resist helping South Africa out of this most 
recent economic crisis. As the chairman of the South Africa Reserve Bank explained after an 
emergency meeting of South African creditors met and failed to reach an agreement to extend 
loans, “the banks can’t be seen as helping South Africa because it would be seen as propping up 
apartheid.”222 There is possibly no clearer admission of the extent to which South African leaders 
understood that their position in the international system depended on speeding up the degree to 
which they phased out apartheid. It is this crisis which led, in fact, to the change in leadership 
brought about by the financial crisis and ushered de Klerk into power within the Nationalist 
Party and, eventually, to occupy the office of president.   
While the extent to which leaders felt pressure from external withdrawal of material 
resources is disputed, de Klerk readily admits the effectiveness of internal withdrawals of 
support, explaining that “the black share of personal income increased from 19.8% to over 37% 
between 1970 and 1995,” with black South Africans playing a “dominant role” in South Africa’s 
consumer market and informal markets.223 Not only were material resources being withdrawn 
from the target regime during this time, but by the end of the period under analysis, resources 
were flooding into the coffers of the apartheid regime’s most formidable opponent, the ANC, due 
largely to Mandela’s successful overseas diplomacy and fundraising trip in 1990. The trip 
included many fundraising events, including a $2,500-a-head cocktail party in Manhattan with 
celebreties like Robert De Niro and Eddie Murphy lining up to pay tribute to Mandela, efforts 
which brought in a total of $7 million U.S.D, “a huge amount when translated into rand.”224 This 
outflow of capital and investments and material resources from the target regime at the exact 
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time of an influx of capital into the regime’s primary opponents is the reason this pillar drops to 
the level of “low support” in the final measurement period.  
 
Pillar VI: Coercion 
The ability to enforce obedience (whether through law or through force) allows the 
regime to persuade or coerce its opponents into compliance with its policies. Externally, this is 
more difficult to outline, but the effects of external actors on the targe regime’s ability to carry 
out coercive techniques is what must be observed here. Therefore “full support” under this pillar 
would represent a situation in which external actors (particularly great powers, like the United 
States) completely support the target regime’s ability to carry out sanctions against their NVR 
opponents and shield them from any limits on power within this domain. A score of “no support” 
would represent a situation in which the target regime’s ability to enact sanctions against NVR 
opponents is completely curtailed by internal and external actors, whether through the imposition 
of sanctions on the target regime (e.g. through U.N. Security Council Resolutions) or the 
withdrawal of the means necessary to carry out sanctions against its opponents (e.g. through the 
withdrawal of support or cooperation in helping the target regime target its opponents). Due to 
the decreasing willingness of the U.S. and other world powers to enable South Africa to exercise 
the use of sanctions against the NVR activists and the target regime’s dramatic reversal of using 
sanctions against its black population, this pillar represents one of the most dramatic changes 
during our period of study, going from full support to low support internally and from high 
support to no support externally, as demonstrated in Figure 7, below.  
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Fig. 7. Levels of internal and external support for South Africa’s pillar of coercion. 
 
 
The use of coercive techniques against those who challenged the apartheid regime was 
one of the primary tools that the apartheid regime used with abandon for the duration of the 
period of time under study until the last five to six years (1985/86), when they began to slowly 
respond to internal and external pressure to treat their critics more humanely while 
simultaneously recognizing that coercion was untenable. For example, in 1984 alone, “officials 
arrested 238,894 Africans for pass law offenses.”225 Accordingly, in that year the apartheid 
regime repealed “no fewer than thirty four legislative enactments that had constituted the pass 
laws.”226 The breadth and scope of coercive techniques used by the apartheid regime over the 
course of its rule are myriad, although it is worth examining a few in depth to illustrate how they 
were able to enforce obedience for so long. It should be noted, too, that often exerting pressure 
against the other pillars of power of the apartheid regime included violating laws that the 
apartheid regime had put in place, such as boycotts, which materially impacted the wallets of 
those in the target regime while also breaking laws against such efforts.  
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The apartheid regime had realized after the Defiance Campaign of the 1950s that 
coercion would be necessary in order to combat the threat of nonviolence against its position of 
power. Resultantly, after the 1950s the regime employed a wide array of factors explicitly and 
implicitly designed to ensure NVR tactics would fail in the future, including “arrests of certain 
leaders, harsh new penalties against civil disobedience,”227 and even anti-reporting provisions 
such as the Prisons Act, “which made it illegal to take photographs in a prison, of a prison, near a 
prison, or of a prisoner.”228 It should be noted that the press’ compliance with these laws 
internally made it much easier for the government to silence any potentially troublesome leaders 
who may have challenged these laws. Importantly, many in the opposition opted to flee the 
country rather than live under these laws, effectively bolstering the external level of knowledge 
about and opposition to the AAM outside of South Africa, particularly during the 1960s, as 
“scores of young white radicals, demoralized after a decade of fruitless battles, faced with the 
likelihood of imprisonment, left for England, Canada, and the United States to pursue new lives 
as doctors, lawyers, professors, and businesspeople,” leaving those who remained to face the 
regime’s “unfettered brutality” against the dwindling apartheid movement, resulting in an early 
loss of leverage against the target regime during the initial years under study.229 
The most profound example of coercion, however, was the ever-evolving policy known 
as “separate development,” which was established through the Bantu Self-Government Act of 
1959230 and solidified by the Bantu Homelands Acts of 1970.231 The leaders of these bantustans 
were always local chiefs, “selected [by the apartheid regime] for being reliably conservative and 
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obedient to Pretoria’s instructions.”232 In 1972, the government used the homelands to further 
restrict the movement of blacks within South Africa through a provision known as “Section 10,” 
a law which stipulated that “no African could remain in a proclaimed [white] area for more than 
seventy-two hours unless he had fulfilled certain strict requirements, including lawful residence 
in the same area for fifteen years, service with the same employer for ten years, or special 
permission from the labor bureau . . .  [having the effect of] giving [white employers] 
tremendous power over their African employees.”233 From very early on, acquiesent black 
leaders who were “prepared to cooperate could expect influential posts, substantial rewards and 
the possibility of developing their own power-base.”234 Gradually, however, the policy of 
separate development was undermined by increasing numbers of illegal squatter settlements of 
blacks, which Zunes classifies as not only an example of the “Third World phenomenon of rural 
poor desperately seeking work in the cities, but an act of civil disobedience against the one of the 
fundamental pillars of apartheid, [separate development].”235 By 1988, the number of illegal 
squatters were estimated to amount to over 7 million.236 The internal use of coercive techniques 
remained largely unchanged until backfiring against the regime became too great and, with new 
leadership under de Klerk, policies were relaxed, eventually resulting in the unbanning of the 
ANC and allowing protests.237 By 1988, the remaining pillars of apartheid, according to de Klerk, 
included “the continued classification of the population according to race; the lack of full black 
participation in political decision-making processes; and the maintenance of separate residential 
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areas, schools, and hospitals for the difference races.”238 All fell under the internal pillar of 
coercion. 
Having recognized that continued use of these coercive techniques would be impossible, 
the freeing of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC in 1990 signaled the end of the 
apartheid regime’s willingness to use these laws to enforce their system of apartheid, and one of 
the target regime’s strongest and most durable pillars of power had finally collapsed by the final 
year of our analysis. It is clear that this was on the mind of de Klerk during his world tour, which 
he embarked on shortly after these events, as he explains that his goal was to report to the rest of 
the world that he “had found understanding for [South Africa’s] need to find a formula which 
would ensure a fully democratic system of government for all South Africans and would also 
protect all the various components of [their] society.”239 Notably, he recognized that his country 
was not yet there, and “emphasized that [he] had not ventured overseas with a begging list to get 
sanctions . . . lifted,” but rather to “request the international community to re-evaluate South 
Africa’s position in the light of the changed circumstances in [his] country.”240 
Externaly speaking, this pillar provides perhaps one of the most interesting examples of 
the power of NVR solidarity externally to effect change in the target regime. The U.S. developed 
a “two-pronged approach” in its dealings with South Africa under the Kennedy administration, 
which essentially meant “object[ing] to apartheid but [continuing] a normal relationship with the 
country,” which included supplying them with the material and military support necessary to 
“fight Communists,” but with the stipulation that weapons must not be used against 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238	  de	  Klerk,	  The	  Last	  Trek,	  111.	  
239	  de	  Klerk,	  The	  Last	  Trek,	  185.	  
240	  Ibid.,	  185.	  
	   81	  
“nationalists.”241 As a result, the apartheid regime learned early on to attribute all domestic 
disturbances to Communist forces acting within the country, and as early as 1950 (with the 
Suppression of Communism Act) “conveniently described communism as any effort to bring 
about any political, industrial, social, or economic change . . . by the promotion of disturbances  
or disorder.”242 The U.S. did try to limit sales of weapons that could be used on South Africa’s 
domestic population, such as Johnson’s broad interpretation of Kennedy’s unilateral ban on 
weapons sales to South Africa to include “heavy-duty capital goods such as metalworking 
machines and precision drills” and “grey area items . . . like Cessna airplanes that could be 
converted to military use by the S.A. Defence Force (SADF),” but took “no official position” on 
Ameican investment.243 South Africa was able to ensure their ability to use coercion with the 
help of great powers on the vague assurances that they only be used to “fight communism,” 
while the U.S. benefited from missile tracking stations within the country.244 South African 
officials also interpreted Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s secret suggestion to Ambassador Naude 
of a complete “redraw[ing] of  boundaries [of Southern Africa] to create six or eight largely 
black states and two or three white ones . . . joined in a confederation whose central authority 
would care only about external defense” as a U.S. endorsement of and support for the idea of 
separate development, an idea to which “Naude happily agreed.”245  
Early efforts aimed at providing any teeth to measures designed to curtail this pillar of 
power within South Africa at the United Nations were dismissed, as evidenced by South African 
Foreign Minister Louw in 1962, who argued that the “restrictions would fail because more than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241	  Massie,	  Loosing	  the	  Bonds,	  128.	  
242	  Welsh,	  A	  History	  of	  South	  Africa,	  445.	  
243	  Massie,	  Loosing	  the	  Bonds,	  196.	  
244	  Ibid.,	  133.	  
245	  Ibid.,	  152.	  
	   82	  
three-fifths of South Africa’s imports came from countries that had opposed the measure.”246 
Even during the beginning of the final years of analysis in the 1980s, the U.S. actively shielded 
South Africa from the need to curtail its use of coercive techniques, most notably during the 
Reagan administration’s intervention in 1982 in support of South Africa’s loan from the IMF for 
$1.1 billion, in spite of U.N. General Assembly opposition (121 to 3), which the IMF made two 
weeks after the vote.247  
One notable exception of early (and strategically successful) international dissent and 
withdrawal of support for the key apartheid feature of segregation of the races arose within the 
world of sports. In 1964, the Olympic Committee (IOC) refused to allow South Africa to 
compete due to Verwoerd’s refusal to allow blacks to compete, and due to increased activism in 
an effort led largely by Jackie Robinson, again pressured the IOC to do so in 1968.248 In a 
country where the white population deeply valued sports, this was no small matter, and protests 
like the ones experienced in the U.K. during a 1969 tour by the South African rugby team, the 
Springboks (which even included the Queen’s refusal to attend any matches) stung deeply. This 
led to an early victory when in 1970, white South African athletes “called for a national 
conference to discuss the future of sports and to ease the apartheid restrictions to combat South 
Africa’s growing isolation,” leading the government to consider “a range of concessions” and 
American columnist Anthony Lewis to note that “outside pressure, when consistently applied, 
worked.”249  
The primary reason for the decrease in this pillar’s external score from partial support to 
none during the final period of analysis was the ratcheting up of NVR activity and the 
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corresponding loss of support for those pillars externally. The best example of this came in 1984. 
In a strategically effective and highly visible external NVR campaign, activists in Washington 
D.C. began following the lead of high-profile activist and, at the time, head of the TransAfrica 
organization, Randall Robinson, by staging sit-ins at the South African Embassy in D.C. These 
protests were aimed at demonstrating solidarity with South African union and political leaders 
and were brilliantly simple. Channeling MLK Jr., Robinson went into the embassy with D.C. 
Representative Walter Fauntroy and U.S. Civil Rights Commission Member Mary Frances Berry 
on November 21, 1984, demanded the immediate release of over 100 United Democratic Front 
leaders held in South African prisons, and refused to leave until their demands were met.250 It 
made headlines when Fauntroy waived his congressional immunity and the others refused bail, 
all of them spending the night in jail and setting a pattern which would be followed over the 
course of the next year by “union leaders, college students, congressional representatives, 
musicians, professors, mayors, movie stars, and clergy,” and notables like Jimmy Carter’s 
daughter, Martin Luther King Jr.’s children, and Coretta Scott King, who “presented herself for 
arrest for the first time in her life” after years of staying home to watch her children during her 
husband’s years of activism.251 This “Free South Africa Movement,” as it came to be known, 
eventually spread to other cities in which South Africa had an embassy presence, and thanks in 
large part to the “size of the demonstrations, the number of arrests, and the rapid diffusion to 
other cities it captured the attention of Congress and threw the Reagan administration on the 
defensive.”252 This produced a dramatic shift in tone from even the “most ardent conservatives” 
in the House, including Newt Gingrich, many of who signed onto a formal letter from over thirty 
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U.S. Representatives just a little over a month after the protests had begun “cautioning [South 
African] Ambassador Fourie not to take their support for granted,” and threatening that if the 
regime continued to use the Reagan administration’s policy of constructive engagement “as an 
excuse for maintaining the unacceptable status quo” they would in turn “recommend the 
implementation of restrictions on investment and of other international and diplomatic and 
economic sanctions against South Africa.”253 This event perhaps better than any other most 
visibly demonstrates the “extension of the South African NVR battlefield” into the heart of the 
country that could do the most to change the trajectory of the campaign’s future path, the U.S., 
and lends much support to my hypothesis. 
 
Discussion of Findings 
 By compiling all of the data and merging the internal and external pillars, it is possible to 
construct a visual representation of the strength of each individual pillar of power over time to 
better visualize the degree to which the apartheid regime lost support over time by the final 
period of analysis in 1991, which can be found below in Figure 8. 
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Fig. 8. Merged internal and external pillars of support for the apartheid regime from 1961 to 1991. 
  
What is revealed is that the target regime experienced significant losses in each pillar of 
power internally and externally, although by the end of the period of study coercion and 
cohesion/collective purpose were the lowest, followed by the pillars of authority and human 
resouces/skills and knowledge, and followed finally by material resources, representing the 
greatest source of power at the end of our period of study. None of these were particularly strong, 
but it is clear that by 1991 the target regime was no longer willing to use sanctions against NVR 
activists, due in large part to its concern about world opinion and the desire to restore a favorable 
economic climate. In order to determine the degree to which external forces played a role in this 
phenomenon, we can look at the final year under analysis, which includes the period of time that 
experienced the most intense NVR activity as depicted below in Figure 9. 
0	  
0.5	  
1	  
1.5	  
2	  
Coercion	  
Material	  
Cohesion	  
Human	  
Resources/
Authority	  
1.75	  
2	  
1.25	  
1.5	  
1.25	  
0.25	  
0.75	  
0.25	  
0.5	  
0.5	  
1991	  
1981	  
1971	  
1961	  
	   86	  
 
 
Fig. 9. South African internal/external pillars of power in 1991.  
 
The picture that emerges in the final year of the time-series analysis is one in which the 
apartheid regime’s “roof” was collapsing under the weight of apartheid, which was becoming 
increasingly out-of-sync with individuals’ values within the country and had by this time become 
completely at odds with world opinion. By 1991 only a few key coercive laws remained, but 
there was broad recognition by those in positions of power on both sides that these would be 
shortly removed, and the unbanning of political parties by this time signalled that the remaining 
laws would soon be gone. Authority is perhaps one of the most important ways in which the 
apartheid regime still benefited from external support, although it was clear to de Klerk and 
others in the target regime that this would not last if dramatic changes did not come about very 
quickly, and signs that international actors were losing their patience with the regime could be 
found everywhere. Similarly, by this time many companies had divested and a resulting loss in 
the human resources propping up the regime and the skills and knowledge of those resources had 
been severely felt. Material resources, too, remained, but had been severely reduced.  
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 In support of my hypothesis that the withdrawal of external support for the target regime 
increases the strategic success of an NVR campaign, it is clear that a loss of external support in 
all pillars was experienced by the apartheid regime. This had an impact on the regime’s eventual 
agreement to the constitutional reforms demanded by the AAM, which eventually led to Nelson 
Mandela’s presidency after South Africa’s first truly democratic election. Additionally, what is 
perhaps most telling is the sustained effort with which NVR activists put into challenging one of 
the target regime’s biggest supporters, the U.S., through a solidarity campaign designed to 
highlight both the injustices of the target regime and U.S. complicity in providing cover to this 
regime, literally “extending the battlefield” through a massive sit-in campaign in which scores of 
high-profile figures were arrested in the nation’s capital. While strategically targeted, it also 
represents the degree to which external intangible factors had changed dramatically since the 
1960s, when JFK (and, to a lesser degree, his successors) could ignore their hypocritical 
approach towards South Africa due to the lack of any domestic pressure. By the mid 1980s, that 
pressure had arrived, and politicans of all stripes took note and chose sides, the vast majority of 
whom eventually ended up opposing the apartheid regime. In a telling interview that highlights 
the extent of this shift in public opinion and the ways in which these variables interact, Robert 
Walker, a Republican from Pennsylvania and drafter of the threatening letter to Ambassador 
Fourie in 1984, explained his reasoning as follows: 
We were disturbed to see all conservatives lumped together as supporters of, or at 
least acquiescing to, apartheid. We decided to take steps to break this stereotype 
by taking a public step to show our disapproval. . . . This, we felt, would send a 
signal to the South African government that it cannot count on all conservatives to 
‘look the other way.’ We hoped this move would change the tenor of the debate 
not only in this country, but in South Africa as well.254 
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With some translation, this explanation can easily be seen as an explanation of the interaction of 
variables that were perhaps most causal in bringing about change within South Africa. As Klotz 
rightly points out, new norms of racial equality were changing the debate here in the United 
States, but these new norms represent a shift in the cohesion and collective purpose of the anti-
apartheid movement and its effects on individuals within the U.S. This withdrawal of support 
from the cohesion pillar of power led this group of Senators to publicly threaten to withdraw 
material support from South Africa if certain laws were not changed (i.e. those which kept 
apartheid in place), thus fragmenting the external pillar of support for the apartheid regime (at 
the time primarily consisting of the Republican Congress and President). This shift in opinion is 
perhaps most causal, as without it no massive and sustained action would have taken place to 
undercut any of the other external pillars of power which had allowed the apartheid regime to 
ignore calls for decades to change course and allow full representation. Further analysis in 
chapter five will compare this case with the case of Palestinian resistance to more fully 
understand the interplay of this pillar of power on the other pillars.  
 It is worthwhile to pause here and discuss one notable explanation of why U.S. policy 
changed so dramatically during the period of study, which is the role of international norms in 
reconstituting states’ interests. Klotz’ attributes this dramatic change in U.S. policy to the “global 
norm of racial equality in reconsistuting U.S. interests.”255 Klotz is right to call for an 
examination of “the underemphasized constitutive role” of norms and the “global process of state 
interest formation,” and she gives the anti-apartheid movement its much-deserved praise for 
bringing this about. Her theory is incomplete, however, without this broader understanding of the 
non-unitary nature of power, which realism also places into the “black box” of decision-making 
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and ignores. What is further ignored is that U.N. Resolution 3379 explicitly linked Zionism and 
apartheid together as racist policies,256 suggesting that “global norms” in and of themselves are 
not enough to reconstitute the interests of Great Powers like the U.S. 
 Having thoroughly examined the case of South African resistance, we turn now to an 
examination of the case of Palestinian NVR and an examination of the strength of the pillars of 
the Israeli government during our period under analysis in chapter four.  
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Chapter IV: The Case of the Palestinian NVR Campaign 
We turn now to our second case, which is that of Palestinian NVR against the target 
regime of the State of Israel. While the nonviolent resistance (NVR) campaign only took place in 
the final period of analysis in a meaningful, sustained effort, for comparative purposes I will be 
analyzing the strength of all of the pillars for the same time period of time as I did for South 
Africa in order to provide a better understanding of the trajectory of Israel’s pillars of power 
under this period of time in the absence of an NVR campaign against it. There is another reason I 
am examining the entire period, which is that the concept of nonviolence has been utilized 
throughout the history of the conflict by Palestinians to varying degrees. A notable early example 
of NVR can be found in the 1936 general strike organized by the Higher Arab Committee under 
the British Mandatory period, calling for an end to Jewish immigration, land sales, and the 
establishment of an Arab government.257 While more difficult to observe and analyze, the 
Palestinian concept of sumoud, translated as “perseverance or steadfastness,” is another concept 
that Broning calls “uniquely Palestinian,” and which is characterized as “continuation of daily 
life even in the face of military occupation and oppression.”258 In terms of observation, however, 
sumoud is difficult to distinguish from mere pacifism, and hence for the purposes of analysis we 
will only attribute the dependent variable results of the NVR efforts of the First Intifada, which 
began in December of 1987 and ended in 1990.259 
In analyzing the strength of these pillars over time, the Palestinian disadvantage is most 
concisely summarized by the observation that “the Zionist movement had greater human, 
material, political, and international resources than those available to Palestine’s indigenous 
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Arab population” from the outset. As I will demonstrate, this dynamic remained largely true for 
the entire period under observation.260  
 
Pillar I: Authority 
 To revisit this concept briefly, authority is operationalized internally as the degree to 
which the country’s population (or areas over which the target regime claims to exercise 
authority) recognizes the regime’s legitimacy and, externally, as the extent to which other 
countries and international organizations recognize the target regime’s sovereignty and authority 
in international relations between states. In the analysis that follows, we will see that this first 
pillar’s trajectory took a clear downward path, going from the level of “high support” to “low 
support” in the final year under analysis. The trend is more U-shaped externally, and as Israel 
began to gain international legitimacy it went up to a level of “high support” during the middle 
of our study, but dropped down to partial support during the final year of analysis as the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) emerged as a contender for legitimate authority within 
the occupied territories. The picture that emerges can be seen in Figure 10, below. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Levels of internal and external support for Israeli pillar of authority. 
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The first pillar of authority largely mirrors South Africa’s, given Israel’s internally 
divided population of Jews and Arabs, roughly half of whom despised the target regime and 
consisted of many individuals and groups who did not recognize its legitimacy. Similarly, Israel 
had many neighbors who had gone to war to prevent its establishment in 1948, clearly 
demonstrating the degree to which it was viewed as illegitimate by surrounding Arab nations. 
Indeed, even after the truce that was reached in 1949, Smith explains that, “in principle, a state of 
war still existed; only a cessation of hostilities had been achieved.”261 Despite non-recognition 
and outright hostility, however, Israel’s establishment had been secured through a U.N. 
Resolution and on November 29, 1947, “the General Assembly voted thirty-three to thirteen, 
with ten abstentions, to approve partition; the Soviets surprised many by backing the Zionist 
cause. The right of Jews to an independent state in part of Palestine had been recognized by the 
international community, giving legitimacy to Jewish claims for self-rule.”262 Similarly, Israel 
had “inherited the proto-state institutions that had been developing since the start of the Mandate” 
after the British withdrew from Palestine, and as a result, “Martin Van Creveld writes, ‘Man for 
man, the Jews were better armed, better led, and something that proved decisive, possessed 
countrywide organization, both political and military.’”263  
 The biggest difference between Palestinian resistance and South African opposition was 
organization. Until the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the 1960s, 
the Palestinians utterly lacked anything resembling the ANC, which was able to rival Israeli 
claims to legitimacy. In terms of opposition, the Palestinian authority had been dismantled 
successfully by the start of World War II. One observer has noted that “Palestinians entered 
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World War II in effect headless – without even the semblance of a unified leadership. . . . The 
crippling defeat they had suffered in 1936-39 was among the main reasons they failed to 
overcome [the dissolution of Arab Palestine].”264 In fact, 1928 was the last time that the 
Palestinian Arab Congress had convened.  
 In marked contrast to the South African regime, the Israelis gained international 
legitimacy throughout the entire period under analysis until the final period, during which it 
decreased only slightly. Under President Eisenhower, the United States had attempted to balance 
U.S. interests in the region by maintaining a strategic alliance with Israel, but with an eye 
towards courting the Arab world as well, becoming one of the last U.S. Presidents during our 
period of analysis to engage in a “public scorning” of Israel, telling them in a live TV address to 
withdraw from Sinai and Gaza in 1957, which they did.265 His most notable attempt at resolving 
the conflict sought to strike this balance and achieve a settlement of the Palestinian refugee 
problem that was created by the displacement of Palestinians after the 1948 War (which by 1956 
exceeded a half million)266 through Project Alpha, which would have attempted to fix the borders 
of the region and finance the resettlement of the Palestinian population, but it did not succeed.267 
After Eisenhower, however, U.S. Presidents viewed Israel much more favorably and through a 
lens that involved a significantly higher degree of domestic political calculus (whether out of 
choice or through perceived political pressures), beginning with the election of President John F. 
Kennedy, who “was the first to talk of a ‘special relationship’ with Israel.”268 This special 
relationship endured throughout multiple presidencies, and in the last decade under analysis the 
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U.S. and Israel cemented ties through a number of ways, with Congress declaring Israel a “major 
non-NATO ally” in 1986.269  
Increasing recognition from former enemies of the state of Israel, notably from Egypt, is 
another reason for its increasing gains in its external strength under the pillar of authority. In an 
insightful analysis of the Khartoum Conference and subsequent resolution, Meital argues that, 
contrary to the beliefs that positions were hardened at Khartoum, the resolution which came from 
this meeting of Arab countries actually represented a shift in thinking from one of intransigence 
against the idea of an Israeli state to one of acceptance and realization that  “obtaining Israeli 
withdrawal from all the Arabs (sic) lands conquered in June 1967, with a readiness to employ 
political means to achieve this goal” was the prevailing undercurrent of the conference.270 
Notably, “although lip service was paid to Palestinian rights, Palestinian leaders were not invited 
to the meeting, nor were their concerns high on the agenda.”271  
 Palestinian resurgence after the 1967 War was hard-fought, and while the PLO was 
admitted to the United Nations General Assembly as an observer in 1974272, the Palestinian 
people received little else in the way of international recognition or substantive representation 
until 1991, hence the Israeli pillar of external authority remains relatively high until 1991, the 
final year under analysis, when it drops to the level of partial support. Another reason for the 
relative strength of the Israeli pillar during this time is that for the entire life of the PLO, its 
ability to speak on behalf of the entire Palestinian population was curtailed by its fractious nature. 
Smith explains that one of the reasons that Arafat was unable to openly court Kissinger during 
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his shuttle diplomacy in the 1970s was that, “despite his influence, he still had to take into 
account the attitudes of various factions; to spliniter the organization over such a debate could 
cause him and the PLO to lose credibility as representatives of the Palestinian cause.”273 
Palestinians had managed a small coup in terms of international recognition; however, in the 
1980s two members of Fatah were publicly invited by Marageret Thatcher to London in a move 
that was a “calculated gesture designed to distance Britain from both the U.S. and Israel.”274 Still, 
inviting two members of a political organization that was part of a fledgling Palestinian assembly 
was hardly a declaration of Israel’s unfitness to rule. However, one of the primary goals that 
were achieved by the Palestinians was Palestinian inclusion at the 1991 Madrid Peace 
Conference, with delegates selected by residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip who “made it 
clear that they looked to PLO headquarters in Tunis for their instructions.”275 The Israeli external 
pillar of authority remained relatively strong until the PLO declared Palestinian independence in 
1988 and Jordan relinquished its claims to the West Bank, leaving Israel as the sole occupier 
with over fifty countries recognizing Palestine as a sovereign country within three weeks of their 
declaration.276 This meant that Israel now had a competing source of authority within the 
Occupied Territories with which it had to deal that was recognized by a significant minority of 
other countries as legitimate. 
Internally, while Israel was always viewed by Palestinians as illegitimate, this pillar faced 
its most serious challenge during the final years under analysis as the Intifada saw an explosion 
of committees in the Occupied Territories as “the neighborhood became the basic unit of social 
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and political organization.”277 These organizations gained legitimacy “nearly immediately,” as 
“representatives of the DFLP [Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine], Fateh, the PFLP 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine], and the Communist Party formed the United 
National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU).”278 These committees formed alternative 
institutions to decrease their dependence on the State of Israel, including “organizing banking, 
mail, and other services.” This marks the lowest point of Israeli claims to authority as lack of 
recognition by the Palestinians resulted in alternative institutions within areas under Israeli 
control that actively competed with its claims of legitimacy, represented here by a score of “low 
support.”  
The final analysis paints a picture of consistently decreasing levels of internal support 
and recognition of Israeli authority, with the lowest point occurring during the final period of 
analysis. We can see a clear downward trend of decreasing Israeli internal authority and a U-
shaped curve of Israeli authority externally, suggesting that while Israel’s attempts at bolstering 
their international credibility were highly effective, so was the Palestinian resistance during the 
Intifada. As Chenoweth and Stephan have noted, “the intifada shifted the battlefield to Israel’s 
doorstep and shattered the popular myth that Israel could annex the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
without significant resistance.”279 This establishment of an alternative authority (aptly named the 
“Palestinian Authority”) within the Occupied Territories is perhaps the single greatest change in 
the conflict during the period of time under study, as the Palestinian rejectionist camp took a 
back seat to those seeking to establish a state alongside and in peaceful coexistence with Israel. 
Despite numerous rejectionist critics and problems of corruption, “Palestinians have been 
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engaged in institution-building within the framework of the Oslo Accords” since 1994,280 a 
lasting testament to the power of the NVR campaign that Palestinians undertook. Still, the 
Palestinians were unable to achieve anything on par with the warm reception granted to Nelson 
Mandela in the same year, and their official exclusion from the Madrid conference provides a 
stark contrast with the Israeli maintenance of external recognition of legitimate authority.  
With the pillar of authority thoroughly examined, we turn now to the next two pillars, 
Human Resources and the Skills and Knowledge of those supporters.  
 
Pillars II & III: Human Resources and Skills/Knowledge of Human Resources 
 This merged pillar examines the power of the human resources propping up the target 
regime as well as the skills and knowledge of those individuals and groups. A score of “full 
support” represents a situation in which the human resources and skills/knowledge of those 
groups and individuals propping up the target regime are actively working towards the 
achievement of the goals and policies of the target regime (whether coerced or uncoerced) and/or 
are helping increase the skills and knowledge of those who are doing so, while a score of “no 
support” represents a situation in which the human resources (and the skills and knowledge of 
those groups and individuals) are completely aligned against the goals and policies of the target 
regime. Scores in the middle of these two extremes represent varying levels of external support 
(or lack thereof) for the goals and policies of the target regime in question. The levels of support 
internally and externally are outlined below in Figure 11. 
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Fig. 11. Levels of internal and external support for Israeli pillars of human resources/skills 
and knowledge. 
  
During our period of study, the Israelis were by far the greater recipient of external 
exchanges of human resources and skills, particularly from the United States and especially in 
the areas of scientific and business cooperation. Sharp recounts that “in the early 1970s, Israeli 
academics and businessmen began looking for ways to expand investment in Israel’s high 
technology sector,” resulting in the founding of the U.S.-Israel Binational Science Foundation in 
1972, the Israel-U.S. Binational Research & Development Foundation in 1977, and the 
Binational Agriculture and Research Development fund in 1978, all of which sought to 
strengthen U.S.-Israeli ties and which received U.S. Congressional funding.281  
In marked contrast and from early on in the conflict, the Palestinians were at a distinct 
disadvantage economically, forcing many Palestinians into situations similar to that of black 
South Africans, and “by 1930 nearly 30 percent of Arab peasants were landless and another third 
had plots too small for subsistence. Tens of thousands of indebted farmers were forced to leave 
the fields that they had worked for generations . . . [and having moved] to shanties on the 
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outskirts of Palestine’s budding towns, they worked as cheap laborers.”282 This situation of 
Palestinian dependence upon access to Israeli markets remained true for the entire period under 
analysis. Smith explains that upon the beginning of the First Intifada, Palestinians were in a state 
of “total dependence on employment in Israel,” despite “early warnings by Israeli and other 
experts that ‘Palestinian anger is stoked by poverty’” and arguments “by Israeli economists that 
‘for growth the Palestinians must have open borders with Israel . . . [because] if you separate 
them [the two economies], one of them will die and it is obvious that that one will be the 
Palestinian economy.’”283 In terms of Israel’s internal pillar of human power and skills and 
knowledge, then, Palestinians not only helped prop up the Israeli regime, but were unable to 
effectively withdraw support due to their dependence upon the target regime for key provision of 
services and economic growth. One noteworthy example comes from the height of NVR 
activities during the First Intifada, whereby male Gazans had been forbidden from entering Israel 
without a magnetized identity card, which could only be obtained through “demonstrating a 
flawless security and tax record,” which Intifada leaders in Gaza forbade. However, “after 
several weeks, the UNLU recognized that blocking work in Israel was creating excessive 
hardship. It thereupon returned the cards and ceased to mention the issue.”284 The Israelis could 
argue with a straight face that, in “twenty years of occupation . . . income and consumption 
levels had improved enormously in the West Bank and Gaza since 1967; a 1987 government 
report claimed that the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] 
had risen 400 percent, and the GDP of Gaza 430 percent, in this time.”285 
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 The second prong of this two-pronged pillar measures the skills and knowledge of those 
either supporting or working against the target regime, and here we do find areas in which 
Palestinians were able to effectively target the regime, albeit in a limited way and particulrly 
during the 1970s, the “establishment of Palestinian universitities . . . brought young people from 
different backgrounds together in an activist student movement.”286 This development bore fruit 
in the years to come in the First Intifada as “ a new and distinctive Palestinian leadership – 
university educated, nationalistic, and more democratic minded than the older generation – 
shifted the locus of power.”287 At the same time, organizations on both sides of the Green Line 
rose up to combat the target regime’s policies in relation to the Palestinian struggle. Perhaps 
most notable among them was the Birzeit Solidarity Committee (BSC), “a group formed in 1981 
to protest Israel’s closure of Birzeit University in the West Bank,” which was “the first Israeli 
peace group to physically move its activities to the occupied territories.”288 Chenoweth and 
Stephan recount that, “by mid-February 1988 there were more than thirty different organizations 
active in Israel to protest Israel’s violent repression of the uprising,” including Peace Now, which 
“mobilized thousands of Israelis for rallies demanding a negotiated settlement to the Israeli-Arab 
conflict.”289 This highly educated group of leaders were the ones responsible for the highly-
organized nature of the First Intifada, which issued comminuques, known as Bayans, that 
called on different social sectors to contribute in defined ways [to the NVR 
campaign]. For example, Bayan no. 3 encouraged academics to write poems, 
songs, and slogans; Bayan no. 27 urged lawyers to organize press conferences; 
Bayan no. 36 appealed to accountants to refrain from preparing tax reports; and 
bayan no. 48 asked students to do their patriotic duty by behaving responsibly 
during exams.290 
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Finally, within Israel there were loyalty shifts, although they were relatively small and 
did not impede the government from carrying out its policies. Most notable was the civil 
disobedience of 500 reservists who signed a petition expressing their refusal to serve in the 
occupied territories in June of 1988.291 In the end, though, one of the reasons for failure that 
Chenoweth and Stephan point to is the failure of the Intifada to “extend the nonviolent battlefield” 
within Israel or other key countries, particularly the United States, even Palestinians within Israel. 
Mubarak Awad, a leading Palestinian NVR proponent, explained that “the PLO could have 
encouraged Palestinian citizens of Israel to launch a nonviolent movement for equal citizen 
rights inside Israel in order to support the Palestinian struggle for self-determination inside the 
occupied territories,” a fact with which former Knesset member and Palestinian, Azmi Bishara, 
agrees, explaining that “there was no strategic cooperation between the UNLU and leaders of the 
Arab-Israeli community.”292  
Most notably, the Palestinians had no significant organizations to lobby on their behalf 
externally. While news reports of the Intifada gained some media attention, the Palestinians were 
unable to capitalize on the media outcry against perceived Israeli brutality because they had 
never established any significant external presence in key countries, particularly the United 
States. The lobbying organization American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is perhaps 
the best example of an effective lobbying organization. It was founded in 1951 “to appeal 
directly to Congress for support,” and “from 1978-2000 . . . . Israeli Political Action Committees 
(PACS) outspent Arab/Muslim PACS 99 to 1 in Congressional contributions.”293 This key 
difference between Palestinians and black South Africans of having sympathetic individuals and 
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organizations outside the zone of conflict working on their behalf is a key difference between the 
two cases that will be further explored in the final chapter in order to understand how the 
extension of the NVR battlefield enabled the NVR movement within South Africa to secure 
victory while the Palestinians had to content themselves with only partial recognition.  
 
Pillar IV: Cohesion & Collective Purpose 
 The fourth pillar measures the extent to which the target regime’s supporters within and 
outside of the zone of conflict are unified by a collective purpose. Full support under this pillar 
represents a situation in which the psychological and ideological beliefs underpinning the target 
regime’s authority are completely in harmony, while no support represents a situation in which 
the target regime’s legitimacy is completely bankrupt and there is (nearly) complete 
condemnation for the ideas it represents. Below, Figure 12 depicts the levels of support for the 
target regime during the period of study.  
 
Fig. 12. Levels of internal and external support for Israel’s pillar of cohesion/collective 
purpose. 
 
The internal level of support for this pillar remains at the level of “partial support” for the 
entire period under study until the final year due to the fact that both sides held strong beliefs 
about the opponent that only began to shift as a result of the NVR campaign. Externally speaking, 
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the preponderance of cohesion and unity in support of the target regime was relatively strong and 
on the Israeli side until the final years as well, and the drop from “high support” to “partial 
support” is directly attributable to the Palestinian NVR campaign as well. We will now turn to an 
explanation of the rationale behind these scores. 
Internally speaking, the battle lines were clearly drawn early on in the conflict. Pearlman 
recounts how the Nakba (the Palestinian term for the Israeli Declaration of Independence, which 
is translated as “the catastrophe”) provided the Palestinians with united feelings of “historical 
injustice, exile, and alienation [which] became the basis for a renewed sense of collective 
purpose,” which “increasingly transcended the religious, class, and clan cleavages that had been 
destructive in prior eras.”294 On the Israeli side, Bar-Tal argues that the psychological factor of 
fear has been the driving force since the founding of the country, explaining that “a collective 
fear orientation cuts deeply into the fabric of society members and becomes linked with a 
societal ethos of conflict.”295 He goes on to explain that, for societies locked in intractable 
conflicts, fear leads to a phenomenon whereby a society tends to “stick to its beliefs about the 
causes of threats, about the conflict, about the adversary, and about ways of coping with the 
dangers.” This was certainly true for Israel, and after the 1967 War, Dowty explains that what 
the capturing of the West Bank and Gaza Strip accomplished was to “salvage from oblivion the 
twin ghosts of Jewish maximalism and Palestinian particularism,” meaning, respectively, the 
desire to enlarge the Jewish presence in the former land of ancient Israel and the idea of 
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Palestinians being a distinct population rather than merely Arabs who happened to live in 
Palestine.296  
On the Israeli side, the positions of the “doves” generally was to use the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip as bargaining chips to secure peace. The doves were slowly but surely being 
supplanted, however, by the hawks who wished to retain what they saw as the ancient lands of 
Judea and Samaria. The man who provided the “intellectual underpinnings” for this view was 
Rabbi Avraham Kook, one of the Chief Rabbis in Palestine, who breathed new life into Jewish 
maximalism as “a religious vision thus became a radical political program to carry out the sacred 
task of reclaiming Judea and Samaria by intensive Jewish settlement in all areas of the historic 
homeland.”297 This created a shift in policies on the part of the Israeli government, and this can 
be found in the Galili Document, which articulated the Labor Government’s plans for the 
occupied territories, which would be settled by Russian immigrants. By articulating plans for 
occupied territory that had been declared off limits by United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 242, the Labor Government “effectively nullified its previous declarations regarding 
Resolution 242 and the territories it would be willing to return in exchange for peace.”298 In this 
way, what had been a political calculation on the part of Golda Meir designed to keep her 
government from collapsing became a decision that would unify Palestinian opposition and was 
seen by Palestinians as “evidence of intent to incorporate the West Bank and Gaza into Israel, 
and thus as rejection of the basic principle of partition.”299 At the same time, Bar-Tal recounts 
years of survey data since the 1970s that recount how Israelis have also expressed security 
concerns, which at no point fell below 50%, and only briefly reaching that percentage after 
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Sadat’s 1979 visit to Jerusalem.300 However, in the final years of our last period of analysis, 
beginning in 1986, Bar-Tal reports a period of “dovization” whereby Israelis believed more 
strongly in the possibility of achieving peace, which seems to be mirrored in the relative lack of 
cohesion on the Israeli side as evidenced by the softening of the maximalist position, with a 
survey in 1986 reporting only 43% of Israelis willing to return territories taken in the 1967 War 
to 60% in 1993, and support for negotiations with the PLO going from 43% in September of 
1986 to 58% by March 1989.301 This weakening of cohesion on the Israeli side occurred 
precisely at the point in time when Palestinian unity was at its height, hence the Israeli pillar of 
cohesion and collective purpose is at its lowest point in our final period of analysis while the 
Palestinian unity was at its highest.  
For the Palestinians, the figure who best exemplified Palestinian particularism was Yasir 
Arafat, who took over the PLO in 1967 after establishing his Fateh organization in 1964, 
declaring Palestine an “an indivisible territorial unit” and aiming to secure “total liberation of 
Palestine” through “armed struggle.”302 Arafat’s early maximalist positions are essentially the 
mirror image of the Israeli trajectory, going from maximalist to favoring partition by the end of 
our period of analysis. Palestinian fragmentation is a phenomenon that is well-documented. As 
Pearlman explains, “the PLO stood as a source of leadership and institutions, as well as a focal 
point for the collective purpose of the Palestinian people. Nevertheless, it remained 
fragmented.”303 In terms of structure, she explains that “the PLO was not a political organization 
as much as a political system. It was the umbrella under which Palestinian organizations, as well 
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as the states that stood behind them, bargained over least-common-denominator goals.”304 Still, 
the re-building of a Palestinian identity in the 1970s came along with the rise of pro-PLO 
newspapers and media and the co-mingling of Palestinian students at universities.305 The height 
of Palestinian unity, however, occurred during the First Intifada, which witnessed “youths 
directing their elders, the poor setting an agenda for the well-to-do, the occupied territories 
moving ahead of the PLO in Tunis, and political aspirants shunting the traditional elite to the 
sidelines,” and “what prevented social tensions from becoming an engine of strife . . . was the 
Palestinian movement’s more cohesive organizational structure.”306 It is precisely this unity and 
sense of collective purpose on the Palestinian side that was responsible for the fragmentation on 
the Israeli side, as Pearlman explains that “during the Intifada, activists followed the Israeli press. 
They recognized that that their use of nonlethal strategies fueled disagreements among Israelis 
regarding whether to remain in the territories. . . . Some Palestinians had long advocated 
nonviolent protest on those very grounds.”307 Recognizing the popularity of the movement, even 
the newly-formed Hamas (which was created just three days after the uprising began) recognized 
the need to cooperate, and “neither Hamas nor Islamic Jihad carried out armed attacks during the 
Intifada’s first year” with the exception of the stabbing of a soldier in October of 1988 and the 
nonlethal detonation of two roadside explosives.308  
The external strength of this pillar is similar, but markedly higher, particularly given the 
degree to which the U.S. has helped strengthen this Israeli pillar of power. Arguably Israel’s 
greatest benefactor, the U.S. bias towards Israel is due in no small part to the American political 
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system that pressures elected officials to support Israel while “no comparable counter-pressure 
has existed for the Palestinians,” a development which began with the election of John F. 
Kennedy and was cemented over time, resulting in a procedural bias towards Israel in 
negotiations and the adoption of the Israeli view on many key issues.309 The strength of this pillar 
is, of course, far from universal. The 1975 heated debate and subsequent passage of U.N. 
Resolution 3379 (XXX) condemning Zionism as “a form of racism and racial discrimination” on 
par with South African racism demonstrates the degree to which world opinion was divided over 
the issue.310  
The U.S. stance towards Israel deserves special attention given the degree to which the 
U.S. veto in the U.N. Security Council is “often all that stands between Palestinian independence, 
and is often all that separates Israel from the enforcement power of the U.N. amidst worldwide 
condemnation of ongoing violations of numerous international norms and laws of war.”311 
Concurring, two prominent realists explain that, in spite of pledges to “halt settlement 
construction and to refrain from ‘targeted assassinations’ of Palestinian leaders,” Israeli leaders 
“frequently ignore U.S. requests and renege on promises made to top U.S. leaders.”312 They 
attribute this strong degree of unity between individuals, groups, and leaders in the United States 
to the strength of the Israeli lobby in Washington, the “pro-Israeli” stance of the majority of U.S. 
media institutions, Washington think tanks, and the “charge of antisemitism” against “anyone 
who criticizes Israeli actions or says that pro-Israel groups have significant influence over U.S. 
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Middle East policy.”313 One scholar explains the religious history of this support, concluding that 
“widespread gentile support for Israel is one of the most potent political forces in U.S. foreign 
policy.”314 There is, of course, a strongly religious element to this support, and Mead recounts 
that “making amends for past sins [of Christianity] has long been an important religious test for 
many (although by no means all) American Protestants.” Conversely, “most American Christians 
have felt little or no guilt about their communities’ historical relations with the Muslim 
world.”315  
This U.S. support for Israel remains strong and relatively muted with regard to the 
demands of the Palestinians until the end of our final year of analysis, whereby the shifting 
opinion of even those in the United States was evident with regard to the issue of the plight of 
the Palestinians, which is the area in which we are interested given the goals of the Palestinian 
NVR campaign. Demonstrating this shift in opinion from Reagan to George H.W. Bush, the new 
president “was viscerally opposed to new Israeli settlements in the territories” and the new 
Secretary of State, James Baker, told AIPAC that Israel “must stop building settlements” and 
“reach out to Palestinians,” echoing calls from Senator Bob Dole for the U.S. to cut its foreign 
aid to Israel.316 What is interesting to note is that one individual who saw that the Palestinians 
were winning this battle over public opinion was none other than Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, 
who saw the First Intifada not as a “spontaneous venting of frustration” or “civil disobedience,” 
but as “a form of warfare against Israel and against the Arabs who want to live in peace with us,” 
the ultimate goal of which was “to push [Israel] back to the 1967 lines and to establish another 
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Palestinian state in the areas we leave.”317 Underscoring his understanding of the ways in which 
the Palestinians were attacking Israel through their efforts to change the perceptions of outsiders, 
Shamir states that  
no one in Israel was more aware of the moral and physical dilemmas involved 
than the young soldier patrolling the alleys of camps, interrogating frightened 
inhabitants, subduing rioters, helping to haul thousands off to detention, shooting 
only when he had to, and facing trial himself if he erred and shot too soon. But he 
also knew that in this draining way he was protecting his country no less than on a 
border facing rockets and tanks.318 
 
This shift in opinion was not limited to American elites, and Dr. Mark Lance explains that, 
The intifada was very successful in that for the first time inside the U.S.. 
Palestinians were viewed as victims of aggression. The intifada was presented by 
the U.S. media as a positive shift away from terrorism and towards nonviolent 
resistance. . . . [and] peace and justice groups began to build a coalition around a 
two-state solution.319 
 
In the end, however, Chenoweth and Stephan conclude that “Palestinian-led civilian resistance 
was ended prematurely and replaced by a less-participatory form of resistance,” with the signing 
of the Oslo Accords and the ushering in of the Palestinian Authority to power inside the 
territories. The failure of the Palestinians to foster a “global grassroots movement in support of 
Palestinian rights” was a strategic failure, and one that will be re-examined in chapter five. 
Concluding, Lance explains bluntly that, “The PLO was no ANC.”320 
 
Pillar V: Material 
Perhaps one of the easiest pillars to chart, the preponderance of material power clearly 
was on the Israeli side, both internally and externally, for the entire duration of our study, 
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resulting in one of only two unchanging pillars of power in our study. It is worth revisiting the 
definition of material resources, which are those non-human resources that enable a regime to 
function and survive, sustain itself, and carry out its policies. It includes economic strength, 
weapons, and other tools the regime has at its disposal which allow it to carry out its policies. 
Internally, these material resources may be threatened by external economic sanctions or 
prohibitions against the target regime which make it difficult to secure the resources it needs for 
its survival, but it is the relative level of material resources that the regime has at its disposal in 
order to maintain its position of power which matters. It is worth remembering that the degree to 
which material and monetary support flows into the country through investments, loans, weapons 
sales, and technological support also represent external material resources, and that “full support” 
would represent a situation in which 100% of the control of material resources is in the hands of 
the target regime and its supporters, while “no support” would represent a situation in which 
100% of the control of material resources is in the hands of its opponents internally. An analysis 
of Israel’s material resources is depicted below in Figure 13. 
 
Fig. 13. Levels of internal and external support for the pillar of material support. 
  
The overwhelming strength of the material resources at the disposal of the Israelis comes 
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explains that “waves of immigrants brought human and material resources [while] effective 
champions outside Palestine offered both funding and lobbying with foreign governments,” 
while in stark contrast, “the Arabs of Palestine neither received such outside support nor 
experienced such internal institution building.”321 The only real infusion of material support to 
the Palestinians came with transfers to the PLO, particularly after 1978, when “Arab states 
pledged $250 million per year to the PLO, in addition to $150 million for a joint PLO-Jordanian 
committee to distribute to the occupied territories. . . . [which] rendered the PLO something of a 
rentier national liberation movement,”322 and which in no way rivaled Israeli aid during the same 
periods of time, which always dwarfed aid to the Palestinians.  
 Conversely, the seedlings of Israeli dominance in the region began in 1948, when Israel 
purchased “twenty Auster planes” in January of 1948 from the British and “24,500 rifles, 5,200 
machine guns, and 54 million rounds of ammunition” from Czechoslovakia.”323 Israel became 
adept at securing aid from 1948 and onwards, and in the 1950s sought to bolster their military 
power. In 1954, Shimon Peres (at the time the Israeli envoy to France from the Israeli Defense 
Ministry) was able to secure an arms agreement which “provided jets, tanks, and radar 
equipment, shipped under great secrecy” during official American neutrality.324 This neutrality 
changed during the 1960s, however, and while France “refused to continue in [the role of 
supplying offensive weapons to Israel]”, the Johnson administration “accelerated a U.S. 
commitment to arm Israel” by granting “Israel’s request for tanks, a major step, since these were 
the first truly offensive weapons the United States had authorized for that country.”325 Indeed, 
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before 1967, “U.S. aid to Israel had been almost entirely non-military and only once exceeded 
$100 million in a given year. After the war the total jumped to $160 million in 1969 and to $643 
million in 1971, most of it in military loans.”326 By the end of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, 
Israel had realized, as had South Africa, that it must develop its own arms industry in order to 
secure its future survival, and in the 1970s it quickly became the country’s “biggest export 
earner,” and “brought in much needed foreign currency, helped redress the country’s severe trade 
imbalance, and provided work for countless engineers and scientists returning from overseas 
with advanced degrees.”327 One of their first large (and eager) customers was South Africa, 
which “seemed like the ideal customer: a developing country with a defense-conscious, right-
wing government that did not have close ties to the Arab-Muslim bloc. It was a perfect 
match.”328   
 In terms of monetary support, the Israeli economy has benefited from a far greater influx 
of support over the years, particularly from the United States. From 1949-1994, U.S. aid to Israel 
amounted to over $68 billion,329 while aid to Palestinians (primarily through aid channeled 
through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees) has amounted to a 
little under $2 billion during the same period of time.330 While it is true that the Palestinians 
received some aid from other Arab countries, in general, until the 1990s “Arab governments 
refrained from contributing to UNRWA’s budget in an effort to keep the Palestinian refugee 
issue on the international agenda and to press Israel to accept responsibility for their plight.”331  
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In terms of relative internal economic power, the Israelis again possess the clear 
advantage. Figure 14, below, graphs the Gross Domestic Product per capita of each country and 
illustrates the strength of the Israeli and Palestinian economies: 
 
Fig. 14. Comparison of the GDP per capitas of the Israeli and Palestinian economies. Reproduced from The World 
Bank.332 
 
While there was no tracking of the Palestinian economy by the World Bank until 1994, the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip combined had a GDP per capita of just $1,201 in 1994, just three years after 
our final period of analysis. This amount is lower than Israel’s GDP per capita for the entire 
period under analysis. At the same time, the Israeli economy had reached nearly ten times that 
amount in 1991, with a GDP per capita of $11,956.333  
To conclude the analysis of Israel and Palestine’s relative levels of material support, it is 
clear that Israel maintained a complete and total advantage throughout the period of analysis, as 
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evidenced by its economic and military strength. This internal pillar was bolstered by external 
support through different countries in each of the periods of time under study, and was matched 
by the support that it received from external sources, helping to subsidize its struggling economy 
during its early years. This, again, stands in marked contrast to the South African economy’s 
collapse under external pressure during its final years, another area that will be examined more 
closely during the final chapter. We turn now to our final area of analysis, which is that of the 
use of coercion by the Israeli government. 
 
Pillar VI: Coercion 
Internally, the ability to enforce obedience (whether through law or through force) allows 
the regime to persuade or coerce its opponents into compliance with its policies. Externally, this 
is more difficult to outline, but the effects of external actors on the target regime’s ability to use 
coercion is what must be observed. Full support under this pillar would represent a situation in 
which external actors (particularly great powers, like the United States) completely support the 
target regime’s ability to carry out coercive techniques against their NVR opponents and shield 
them from any limits on power within this domain. “No support” would represent a situation in 
which the target regime’s ability to use coercion against NVR opponents is completely curtailed 
by internal and external actors, whether through the imposition of sanctions on the target regime 
(e.g. through U.N. Security Council Resolutions) or the withdrawal of the means necessary to 
coerce its opponents (e.g. through the withdrawal of support or cooperation in helping the target 
regime target its opponents). Due to the unfettered ability and willingness of the State of Israel to 
use coercion against the entire Palestinian population during the entire period under analysis, this 
	   115	  
pillar, too, remains at the level of “full support” internally and externally from 1961 to 1991, as 
depicted in Figure 15, below.   
 
Fig. 15. Levels of internal and external support for the Israeli pillar of coercion. 
 
Internally speaking, the Israeli pillar of coercion started and ended strong during our period of 
analysis. The list of coercive techniques used by the Israelis against the Palestinians is long, but 
worth recounting, beginning before 1961, when Israel defied U.N. Resolution 194 (which 
affirmed the right of displaced Palestinians to return to their homes in the new State of Israel) 
and “sealed the borders.”334 Additionally, Israel responded to attempts made by Palestinians to 
return to their homes inside the State of Israel through “harsh reprisal raids causing deaths in the 
thousands” against those who sought to “return to their homes, harvest crops, or smuggle 
goods.”335 After Israel gained control over East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
following the 1967 War, protests erupted and many “prominent individuals issued manifestos 
condemning the occupation. Lawyers and teachers went on strike, and local elites formed 
committees to launch a campaign of civil disobedience.”336 In what would become a pattern of 
Israeli occupation, nonviolent and violent threats were treated similarly, and “Israeli authorities 
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suppressed this activity by deporting, imprisoning, or harassing those who spearheaded it.”337 
Through the army and (after 1981) the Civil Administration, the Israelis: 
governed Palestinian life through some twelve hundred military orders that served 
as law under occupation. Israel punished political activism with such measures as 
house demolitions, imprisonment, curfew, travel restrictions, and ‘administrative 
detention’ without charge or trial. From 1967 to 1978 it deported more than one 
thousand Palestinians.338 
 
The Israeli government ratcheted up these policies under Prime Minister Begin’s government in 
1981 by beginning the “Iron Fist,” which consisted of “a series of policies that expanded curfew 
and restrictions on political activity, universities, and the press, as well as more forceful military 
repression.”339 Often times this military repression came in the form of policies which were at 
odds with international norms, particularly with regard to interrogation techniques, which 
included “sleep and food deprivation, verbal abuse and threats, intense noise, hooding, forced 
standing, binding in painful positions, solitary confinement, enclosure in tight spaces, exposure 
to extreme temperates, denial of access to toilets, genital abuse, shakings, and beatings.”340 In the 
face of increased violence in the territories, Rabin “revived the Iron Fist policy with such 
countermeasures as administrative detention, censorship, school closures, and deportations.”341  
The height of NVR leverage exerted against this Israeli pillar of power was during the 
First Intifada, which saw Palestinians creatively and persistently disregard Israeli coercion as 
“people of all walks of life sought ‘to create a daily series of acts of defiance’ that would assert 
their nationalist will, demonstrate the unsustainability of military rule, and compel Israel to reach 
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an agreement with the PLO.”342 In one sense defying Israeli laws at the time was not hard to do, 
given that “terrorist acitivites included everything from painting slogans and graffiti to singing 
national songs to making the victory sign, displaying the Palestinian flag, throwing stones, 
burning tires, demonstrating, and forming political gatherings,” and “authorities arrested or 
detained close to half a million Palestinians for these reasons prior to and during the First 
Intifada.”343  
While the Israeli government began to experience backfiring for their harsh reprisals 
during the Intifada, it simply responded by ratcheting up the use of coercive techniques. Upon 
realizing that media coverage of events inside the West Bank and Gaza Strip, such as 1988 CBS 
coverage of Israeli soldiers “breaking the limbs of four Palestinian youths with rocks and clubs” 
or the “live burial of Palestinian youths,” the government responded simply by limiting media 
coverage in the occupied territories through extreme forms of censorship, including “revoking 
the visas of foreign journalists . . . declaring military closures, and arbitrarily denying access to 
the occupied territories.”344 Underscoring the degree to which the Israelis viewed the NVR 
campaign as an existential threat was the “Ship of Return” episode whereby the PLO attempted 
to “transport 130 Palestinians who had been deported since 1948 from Cyprus to Haifa” in order 
to “raise international awareness about the plight of Palestinian deportees,” which was deemed a 
“declaration of war” by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and subsequently bombed by the Israeli 
Mossad a day before it was scheduled to depart.345  
The Israeli government was able to maintain its internally high levels of coercion due in 
no small part to the cover provided by the United States, its strongest benefactor, whose “special 
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relationship” began in the first year of our analysis under President John F. Kennedy. Since then, 
the U.S. has shielded Israel from many potentially curtailing resolutions, particularly after the 
1967 War with the intense negotiations surrounding Security Council Resolution 242, which was 
“the result of hard bargaining among the permanent members of the Security Council: the Soviet 
Union demanded immediate Israeli withdrawal, the United States sought to secure Arab 
acceptance of Israel and a final settlement.”346 In the same decade, the U.S. also sought to shield 
Israel from having to reveal its nuclear program, allowing them not to go public or forcing them 
to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.347 Mearsheimer and Walt have argued that 
“Washington provides Israel with consistent diplomatic support. Since 1982, the United States 
has vetoed 33 United Nations Security Council resolutions that were critical of Israel, a number 
greater than the combined total of vetoes cast by all the other Security Council members.”348 
This cover for the use of coercion extends to coercive techniques enacted outside the strict zones 
of conflict, and in 1985 U.S. President Ronald Reagan made excuses for Israel after they bombed 
the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 1985, calling it a “legitimate response” to a Palestinian 
assassination squad killing three Israelis in Cyprus.349 This response was particularly upsetting to 
the Tunisians given that “Tunis had agreed to house the PLO in 1982 at Washington’s request” 
in 1982, and Reagan later backtracked, calling the incident “understandable but unfortunate.”350  
The only time in our period of analysis that the United States was unwilling to shield 
Israel with regard to their treatment of Palestinians was a U.N. Security Council Resolution 
“denouncing Israel’s disproportionate use of force against Palestinian civilians,” which passed in 
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December of 1987 when the United States abstained.351 Still, the resolution did nothing concrete 
to force Israel to stop the crackdown against protesting Palestinians, and their continued arrest of 
UNLU members during the Intifada was ultimately successful in ending the uprising. While 
leaders on the ground were initially replaced steadily and “again and again, Israel arrested 
UNLU members, and factions replaced them,” however this “could not be sustained indefinitely,” 
and “by March 1990, Israel’s imprisonment of consecutive UNLU coalitions had ended its 
operation as a coherent entity,” allowing Israel to essentially fragment the leadership of the NVR 
campaign through its use of coercion.352 In the end, one activist claimed that “the PLO ‘hijacked’ 
the uprising,” and the end of the Intifada was accompanied by “diverging interests, loss of vision, 
and factional power struggles.”353  
Having outlined each pillar of power’s strength over time, we turn to a discussion of the 
findings before analyzing the key differences between the two cases.  
 
Discussion of Findings 
 By compiling all of the data and merging the internal and external pillars, we can again 
construct a visual representation of the strength of each individual pillar of power over time to 
better visualize the degree to which the Israeli regime lost support over time by the final period 
of analysis in 1991, which is pictured below in Figure 16. 
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Fig. 16. Merged internal and external pillars of support for the Israeli government from 1961 to 1991.  
 
 
This analysis demonstrates that the Iraeli regime was much stronger than the apartheid 
regime throughout the entire period under study. Their ability to maintain their material 
superiority and use of coercion unfettered is perhaps the biggest contrast, but at its lowest point 
in 1991, the Israeli government still had relatively strong pillars of support for their regime 
internally and externally, and the two lowest pillars are at the same strength as South Africa’s 
material pillar of power in 1991, which was its highest. While the coercion and material pillars 
remain unchanged, this does not mean that the Palestinians did not seek to undercut them. 
However, their efforts were unsuccessful, and the target regime was able to withstand and fight 
back against their attempts successfully, particularly with outside help. While the South African 
regime was facing increasing amounts of pressure, particularly from a growing overseas base of 
human support which was helping to sever U.S. ties to the apartheid regime, Israel’s trajectory 
was the exact opposite, with an increasingly strong domestic constituency operating virtually 
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unopposed in the political arena. This failure to extend the NVR battlefield is most clearly visible 
in the final year of analysis, which reveals the greatest gains that the NVR campaign achieved as 
evidenced in Figure 17, below. 
 
 
Fig. 17. Israeli internal/external pillars of power in 1991. 
 
 
What is revealed is that by 1991, the Israeli government was astutely battling a large, 
tactically innovative and diverse NVR campaign by maintaining their use of coercive techniques 
even in the face of international criticism. The two most serious threats to their power came from 
the pillars of cohesion and authority, but the dip in the pillar of cohesion was short-lived and 
most pronounced during 1991, after which the Israeli government was able to successfully 
dismantle the NVR campaign’s leadership, resulting in Palestinian fragmentation and a 
resumption of violence on the Palestinian side, while a more united Israeli public rallied around 
their leaders as a new government formed in 1992.354  
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In support of my hypothesis, the finding that Israel was able to fully maintain their use of 
coercive techniques while being shielded from external intervention into the conflict by other 
countries and international organizations provides strong evidence for the argument that great 
power support in NVR campaigns plays a decisive role, particularly in cases where the target 
regime does not depend upon the human or material resources of the NVR resistors, as was the 
case for the Palestinian population. Similarly, the lack of external pressure on the target regime 
lends support to the second hypothesis, given that Palestinian successes were limited to an 
acknowledgement by Jordan that the Palestinians were the only group who could claim 
legitimate control over the West Bank, Israeli and U.S. recognition of the PLO, limited regime 
change (with the end of fifteen years of Likud dominance in the Knesset), and the willingness of 
the Israeli government under Yitzhak Shamir to participate in the Madrid talks, which “one noted 
Israeli scholar concludes, ‘… is impossible to understand . . . without understanding the effect of 
[the First Intifada]’” and which eventually culminated in the Oslo Accords.355 In the final 
analysis, however, the Israeli pillars remained strong and the Palestinian gains were limited and 
tenuous, with many of the gains being reversed as the death of Yitzhak Rabin paved the way for 
a new era of Likud-party dominance that, in the years since the Oslo Accords were signed, has 
expanded the segregated road system, more than doubled the number of Jewish settlements, and 
continued the occupation policies.356 In the final anaysis, the process-tracing method reveals that 
both the lack of external support for the NVR campaign and lack of external pressure on the 
target regime were key missing variables which enabled the Israeli regime to effectively blunt 
the uprising. Having examined both cases, we turn now to our final chapter and examine which 
external actors matter most and what policy implications can be drawn from this study.  
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Chapter V: Conclusion and Discussion 
 In this case study, I have used the method of process-tracing to design a tool that can 
measure the strength of individual pillars of power propping up regimes to measure the 
respective strength of these pillars for two regimes during the same period of time in order to 
better understand how NVR campaigns can be successful in toppling them. In this chapter I will 
summarize my findings and the results of my analysis, explain which causal factors I believe to 
be most important in achieving strategic success in NVR campaigns based on those findings, and 
then explain what policy implications this research has for the United States, particularly as the 
use of NVR becomes more prevalent in the wake of the Arab Spring. 
 
Summary of Findings 
 The most helpful approach to analyzing these results is to compare the two target regimes 
side by side in the final year of analysis, then analyze the relative strength of the independent 
variables across these two cases and then move to an analysis of the strategies employed by each 
NVR campaign to examine their impact upon those pillars of power. We can begin to explore 
this by looking at each of them side by side in Figure 18, below. 
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Fig. 18. Merged internal and external pillars of power comparison of Israeli and South African target regimes in 
1991. 
 
 
Analysis of Strategic Paths to Success (or Lack Thereof) 
 What this side-by-side comparison reveals first is the much greater effectiveness of the 
anti-apartheid movement (AAM) in undercutting the apartheid regime’s pillars of power. Each of 
the South African pillars is lower than those of the Israeli regime in 1991, although some are 
significantly lower. We will now analyze the strategies of each NVR campaign in order to 
determine their strategic paths towards success (in the case of the AAM) and partial success (for 
the Palestinian campaign) and how I believe each case demonstrates support for both of my 
hypotheses. 
 
AAM’s Strategic Path to Success 
In South Africa, as U.S. support for the apartheid regime decreased, the NVR campaign’s 
strength grew. The AAM was able to unify opposition to the apartheid regime internally and 
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externally and clearly define its goals (a potential alternative hypothesis I will examine below) 
early on in the movement, most notably through the slogan “One Man, One Vote,” which 
provided a clear goal and defined the campaign’s objectives. By also providing a clear 
alternative source of authority (most notably through the ANC at the national level and through 
local committees at the grassroots level), the campaign was successfully able to undercut the 
internal sources of authority while demonstrating to external actors that they would have an 
alternative authority with which they could deal in the event that the apartheid regime crumbled. 
Additionally, this cohesion allowed for the AAM to withdraw human and material resources 
from the apartheid regime. The loss of external material support through the enactment of 
sanctions against the apartheid regime resulted in the apartheid regime significantly curtailing its 
use of coercive techniques, thus strengthening the collective purpose and cohesion of the AAM 
while the apartheid regime’s supporters fragmented. Most notably, the NVR activists were able 
to successfully and creatively extend the NVR battlefield, particularly through undercutting 
international support for the apartheid regime’s use of coercion. When Americans saw other 
Americans (particularly famous artists and politicians) being arrested for protesting in the 
nation’s capital, it truly helped to “arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice,”357 
thus fragmenting those in the U.S. who supported the maintenance of the status quo with regard 
to South Africa (whether on economic or diplomatic grounds, or both) and bringing about greater 
cohesion and collective purpose to the opponents of apartheid outside the immediate zone of 
conflict. By making these crucial concessions with regard to coercive techniques, the apartheid 
regime caved to international pressure, eventually allowing the NVR campaign to strengthen and 
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eventually topple the regime through peaceful means. Figure 19 depicts this strategic path to 
success, below. 
 
Fig. 19. AAM’s strategic path to success against the apartheid regime. 
 
Palestinian NVR Campaign’s Strategic Path to Partial Success 
While still confirming my hypotheses, the opposite scenario happened in Israel/Palestine, 
where U.S. support for the target regime remained strong throughout the period under study. 
While the Palestinian campaign was successful (for a while) at unifying opposition internally and 
defying coercive techniques for a significant period of time, there was no opportunity to apply 
leverage against the material sources of power internally (although some notable attempts are 
prevalent), and the withdrawal of human support had no effect on the target regime because, 
simply put, it did not depend upon Palestinian human support for its maintenance of power. The 
campaign was most successful in providing alternative institutions at the local level to withdraw 
support from Israel’s pillar of authority, and it is notable that this is the area in which they 
achieved partial success through the recognition of the PLO as their legitimate representatives 
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and the cessation of Jordanian claims to control of the region. However, Palestinians never 
effectively extended the battlefield into other countries, and certainly not into the U.S. The only 
examples of the lack of cohesion and collective purpose that came about from this campaign was 
through news reports that, at times, shocked the American conscience, but these did not translate 
into substantive policy changes because the Palestinians were at a complete disadvantage when it 
came to external human support given the strength of the Israeli lobby within the U.S. and the 
corresponding weakness (even nonexistence) of a Palestinian lobby. This had a direct effect on 
the inability of the NVR campaign to achieve full strategic success, as the continual use of 
coercion by the Israeli government against the NVR campaign was ultimately successful in 
curtailing NVR activities and fragmenting the Palestinians. Counterfactually, had the U.S. 
refused to shield Israel from U.N. sanctions, withdrew its funding unless Israel agreed to 
withdraw from the occupied territories, and condemned the Israeli crackdown on protestors and 
sided with the Palestinians by passing legislation similar to the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid 
Act, the results in Israel would likely have been much different. However, this would have 
depended upon the ability to mobilize key actors within the U.S., actors which the AAM had 
been had been focusing on for years leading up to this point in time and which, conversely, the 
Palestinians had completely failed to develop. This lack of pressure on those in government is 
largely (if not exclusively) due to the nonexistence of any groups within the U.S. pressuring 
elected officials to act or drawing attention to the policies of the Israeli government with regard 
to Palestine, policies that Americans may find objectionable. Hence, the inability of the 
Palestinian NVR campaign to extend the battlefield into the U.S. and similarly undercut the 
American pillars of support for the Israeli government can reasonably be said to have played a 
decisive role in the campaign’s failure. Figure 20 depicts this path to partial success.  
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Fig. 20. Palestinian NVR Campaign’s strategic path to partial success against Israel. 
 
Key Differences  
Key differences between the independent variables at work in these cases are outlined in 
Figure 21, below. 
 
Fig. 21. Key differences between AAM and Palestinian NVR campaign. 
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What this analysis reveals is that an extension of the NVR battlefield against those 
individuals, groups, institutions, and countries which helped prop up the target regime did help 
increase the strategic success of the South African NVR campaign, while the failure of 
Palestinian NVR to extend the battlefield significantly contributed to its failure to achieve its 
political goals. I also found in the case of Israel that a target regime that is determined to 
continue its use of coercion will ultimately be successful against an NVR campaign. Palestinians 
cannot be faulted for not targeting these coercive techniques and demonstrated remarkable 
creativity in opposing them, but Israel faced no real pressure to discontinue their use and 
eventually fragmented the NVR campaign’s leadership in the absence of external pressure, 
whereas the apartheid regime faced a very real threat to their continued use of coercive 
techniques if they did not change course significantly, which they did.  
 Similarly, South Africa depended to a large extent on the human resource of black labor 
within their country. Given the lack of Palestinians’ ability to apply leverage against this pillar 
internally, they were even more dependent on the material withdrawal of support that 
international sanctions were able to apply against the apartheid regime, underscoring the 
importance of how each of these pillars interact with one another internally and externally and 
the fact that no two countries maintain their grip on power in exactly the same ways.  
 
Alternative Hypotheses 
 Two potential alternative hypotheses remain which may prove causal. The first is the 
presence of charismatic leadership, perhaps the most famous examples of which are Gandhi’s 
leadership against the British in India and Martin Luther King, Jr.’s leadership in the civil rights 
movement in the U.S. While a common belief is that charismatic leaders are responsible for a 
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campaign’s strategic success, this is not what my analysis reveals. In South Africa, the figure 
who united and inspired many NVR activists was behind prison for most of the NVR campaign 
and still clung to a belief in the legitimacy of violence, even after his release. Similarly, the First 
Intifada was led by a large and diverse group of leaders who were not tied to the traditional 
Palestinian leadership structure of the PLO. In fact, Palestine has had a number of individuals 
who could convincingly become a “Palestinian Gandhi,” but many were effectively coerced, as 
Mubarak Awad’s story illustrates. As “the leading Palestinian advocate of nonviolent struggle,” 
Awad had long called for “total resistance to the occupation,” but was deported to the United 
States.358 However, the UNLU (the primary Palestinian NVR coordinating body during the First 
Intifada) for a long time seemed to have a never-ending supply of leaders and, “for two years, 
every time authorities identified and arrested UNLU members, their factions replaced them with 
new representatives.”359 What is revealed by this analysis, then, is that unfettered use of coercive 
techniques can, and will, effectively exhaust those in leadership positions, and by “the end of 
1988, about ten thousand Palestinians were held without charge or trial in administrative 
detention, a six-month incarceration eligible for renewal.”360 Concurring with this conclusion, 
Arens and Kaufman have found that “the recent uprisings in the Arab world confirm the widely 
shared opinion – [Gene] Sharp included – that a leader is not a necessary condition for success in 
a nonviolent struggle.”361 What this does mean, however, is that attempts to utilize coercive 
techniques must be condemned internationally along with threats of withdrawal of support if 
they are to be successful and allow a campaign to maintain a minimum level of leadership.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358	  Chenoweth	  and	  Stephan,	  Why	  Civil	  Resistance	  Works,	  131.	  
359	  Pearlman,	  Palestinian	  National	  Movement,	  108.	  
360	  Ibid.,	  114.	  
361	  Omri	  Arens	  and	  Edward	  Kaufman,	  "The	  Potential	  Impact	  of	  Palestinian	  
Nonviolent	  Struggle	  on	  Israel:	  Preliminary	  Lessons	  and	  Projections	  for	  the	  Future."	  The	  
Middle	  East	  Journal	  66,	  no.	  2	  (2012):	  245.	  
	   131	  
 A second alternative hypothesis is the lack of clear goals and objectives. While the 
former hypothesis is easier to explain, this one is not. Whereas the AAM had a clear objective in 
“One Person, One Vote,” one Palestinian leader noted that “the main obstacle we face in our 
struggle is that we have no one strategy or vision. We have different factions and fractions within 
factions pursuing different strategies.”362 While we could place this alternative hypothesis under 
the pillar of cohesion and collective purpose, it is worth separate examination as a potential 
separate confounding variable because a clear purpose and vision provided internal and external 
actors a banner behind which they could rally behind the AAM, even if it was scoffed at in the 
1950s. In marked contrast, the lack of a clearly articulated goal for Palestinian NVR allowed 
foreign actors to dictate events and allowed the PLO to “hijack” the NVR campaign and impose 
upon it the leadership’s vision for what it should help accomplish, providing an important lesson 
for future NVR campaigns and demonstrating that “shaking off” may not provide enough vision 
or clarity for a campaign to sustain itself in the face of relentless coercion.  
Which Actors Matter Most? 
 While the answer to the question of which actors matter most may seem obvious, the 
reason is not. My research suggests that the U.S. truly is an important deciding factor in both 
cases, but not in a realist sense. What my case study reveals is that the U.S. is a great power 
because of the large role it played in both conflicts in propping up both target regimes. 
Furthermore, in keeping with the non-unitary nature of power, it is important to understand that 
the U.S. is not a monolith, but that individuals, groups, businesses, and institutions (as well as 
various levels of and branches of government within the U.S.) all played decisive roles in the 
process of redefining the relationship with the target regimes of both cases. The U.S. federal 
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government was able to influence events in both countries in such a dominant way (whether on 
the side of the target regime or its opponents) precisely because it helps to prop up so many 
external pillars of power of regimes it supports. In terms of authority, for example, U.S. 
recognition of authority through formal and informal means confers upon regimes much more 
legitimacy than many small countries banding together to accept or reject a particular regime’s 
sovereignty. Similarly, given the position the U.S. holds as the world’s largest economy, 
investments and favorable trade deals with businesses within the U.S. have an enormous effect 
on the country’s economy, and institutional investors for various types of institutions played a 
decisive role in crippling South Africa’s material sources of power. At the international level, the 
permanent member status that the U.S. holds on the U.N. Security Council also allows it to 
provide a great deal of cover for a country’s use of coercive techniques against NVR resistors or, 
conversely, to allow intervention into that country’s affairs or the imposition of sanctions when it 
disagrees with the target regime’s course of action. In these ways and others, individuals, groups, 
and institutions all played key role in shaping the course of events in both cases. 
On a deeper level of analysis, what this case study reveals is that any country or 
individuals, groups, and institutions which help prop up a regime through externally supporting it 
can and should be effectively targeted by NVR campaigns to the degree that that country (or 
those businesses and institutions inside the country which support the target regime) exerts 
influence inside the zone of conflict and through the means that it exercises that support. For 
example, if NVR activists are targeting a regime that is able to maintain high levels of coercion 
because of the material support that the country receives through oil sales to surrounding 
countries, thus enabling it to pay for troops to enforce its rule, those NVR resistors must undercut 
that material source of power that the regime derives from oil sales by extending the battlefield 
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to countries outside the immediate zone of conflict to push for economic sanctions on the target 
regime. The imposition of economic sanctions on the target regime, then, effectively undercuts 
the regime’s pillar of material support, thus “turning off the spigot,” so to speak, and allows 
NVR resistors to more effectively attack those pillars that fall within the immediate zone of 
conflict, such as poorly paid soldiers utilizing coercive techniques.  
 
Implications for U.S. Policy in Israel/Palestine 
As of this writing, U.S. policy is in flux with regard to our stance in the Israeli/Palestinian 
conflict. The Second Intifada did not follow in the steps of the First Intifada and took a much 
more violent course. However, Palestinian NVR campaigns continue and are strategically 
targeted, such as the Bil’in weekly demonstration against the separation barrier, where 
demonstrations against the barrier center on the separation of the villagers from their agricultural 
lands, 363 demonstrations which continue to the present.364 Other instances of NVR include the 
tax resistance at Bayt Sahur,365 Druze resistance in the Golan Heights,366 and the efforts of 
members of the target regime’s base of supporters like Rabbis for Human Rights.367 There are 
also international movements, such as the International Solidarity Movement, which now has 
support groups in 35 countries, paralleling the largely external Anti-Apartheid Movement 
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(AAM) of South Africa. Palestinian NVR is also increasingly using the tools of new media to 
reach a wider audience,368 and Websites like the “Electronic Intifada” seek to bring about greater 
awareness of Palestinian NVR efforts in other countries.369 However, the story remains largely 
the same, with Israeli coercion and lack of awareness in the U.S. contributing to the status quo, 
even despite clear fissures between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu. For 
example, in a weekly demonstration in Bil’in on September 6 of 2009, the Israeli army attacked 
Al Jazeera reporters during a live broadcast and in February 2010 “raided the offices of the Stop 
the Wall Campaign in Ramallah and confiscated computers and files,” and shortly thereafter 
“several activists of the International Solidarity Movement were arrested in night-raids and 
expelled on charges of violating immigration procedures.”370 In a recent op-ed article, Noam 
Chomsky, an outspoken critic of Israeli policies, put it succinctly how these two cases differ, 
positing that in the case of South Africa, “activism had created such overwhelming international 
opposition to apartheid that individual states and the U.N. had imposed sanctions decades before 
the 1980s, when BD [boycott and divestment] tactics began to be used extensively in the United 
States,” while in sharp contrast, “U.S. investment is flowing into Israel. When Warren Buffett 
bought an Israeli tool-making firm for $2 billion last year, he described Israel as the most 
promising country for investors outside the United States itself.”371  
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Chomsky’s critique of the current strategy of the Palestinian NVR movement could easily 
be reframed into the language of our study. His observation is simply a recognition of one of the 
crucial differences between the South Africa and Israeli governments as target regimes with 
differently constituted internal and external sources of power. In South Africa the extension of 
the NVR battlefield many years before into the U.S. (one of South Africa’s primary external 
pillars of power) allowed them to effectively push for international sanctions and undercut the 
regime’s material pillar of power at a crucial period in that country’s history, effectively toppling 
the regime. In Israel, however, the U.S. government and leading individuals within the U.S. 
business community continue to support Israel through material investment into that country, and 
Chomsky notes that while many in the BDS (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions) movement 
continue to call for all three, the movement should “more accurately” be labeled “BD”, “since 
sanctions, or state actions, are not on the horizon—one of the many significant differences from 
South Africa.”372 
A second oft-overlooked pillar whose importance should not be understated is the pillar 
of authority, which is relatively inexpensive to exercise, assuming one does not count political 
currency as a cost. Whereas the tangible nature of material power is costly in a material sense, 
conferral of authority is economically inexpensive, but can pay big dividends. As I have outlined, 
inviting Mandela to speak to a joint session of Congress and a meeting at the White House 
(while he continued to advocate for violent resistance against the apartheid regime) demonstrates 
the power of the bully pulpit and underscores the fact that public U.S. support is just as (if not 
more) important than other means of support. Arens and Kaufmann argue that: “there is a 
potential for an increasing role for foreign diplomats and world media, as well as solidarity from 
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Israeli civil society in the city and elsewhere. Unfortunately, there is no such combative spirit left 
among Palestinians in the city, left without a legitimated leadership since the death of Faisal 
Husseini, and fear of Israeli reprisals that can damage them as individuals with a relatively better 
position than the rest of their brethren in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.”373 Recognizing 
Palestinian sovereignty on the U.N. Security Council is something the U.S. could do quickly and 
which would have the effect of leveling the playing field between the two countries, allowing 
Palestinians to negotiate their future on more authoritative footing and increasing Palestinian 
cohesion and collective purpose, thus breathing new life into the NVR movement and 
undercutting the violent violent radical flanks who are pursuing similar or competing political 
goals. U.S. policy as conducted now seems to convey a belief that negotiations must occur before 
any recognition of Palestinian authority can be conferred, seemingly obvlivious to the fact that 
official U.S. recognition of Palestinian sovereignty would not only bolster current NVR attempts, 
but would significantly undercut those violent radical flanks who charge that nonviolent efforts 
will not work and that Israel only understands force. 
Finally, perhaps the greatest difference (and potentially most troubling for future policy 
concerns) is that my analysis reveals that Israel simply does not need the Palestinian population. 
Chomsky rightly points out that “In sharp contrast, Israel wants to rid itself of the Palestinian 
burden. The road ahead is not toward South Africa, as commonly alleged, but toward something 
much worse.”374 What my case study reveals was the importance of the withdrawal of human 
support from the apartheid regime, which was a crucial component of that NVR campaign’s 
tactical diversity. What is also revealed, however, is that it was not the only thing that mattered, 
and that it was much more effective when strategies inside and outside the immediate zone of 
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conflict finally merged in an interactive way. This is demonstrated by the unlikely partners of 
businesses in the U.S. and black unions in South Africa agreeing on the necessity of undercutting 
the apartheid regime’s material pillar of power by boycotting South African goods in order to 
topple the regime. For the Palestinians, this internal option of withdrawing human or material 
support is not available, thus making their dependence upon external withdrawal of support even 
more crucial. Consequently, the outlook for a grand NVR strategy remains bleak, or as Broning 
puts it, “a monolithic NVR strategy is as unlikely as it is perhaps desirable,”375 underscoring the 
importance of U.S. policy reframing the debate as either supporting or not supporting a two-state 
solution and hashing out the details after this decision is made on the international level without 
allowing the Israeli government to intervene and stop it.  
 
Conclusion and Future Research 
Through this study I have concluded that external support for regimes that are targeted by 
NVR campaigns can be the deciding factor in whether or not those campaigns succeed to the 
extent that the target regime derives its power from those sources. I have also concluded that the 
higher the costs the target regime faces for its actions, the less likely it is to continue them. I have 
also described the complexity of these interacting variables and how the pillars propping up 
target regimes must be strategically targeted within and outside of the immediate zones of 
conflict if NVR campaigns wish to achieve strategic success. Given the importance of coercion 
in enforcing the rule of the apartheid regime in South Africa and Israeli policies in the occupied 
territories, this study suggests that external actors do matter and must be effectively targeted to 
the extent that they provide cover or help to prop up the target regime. While definitive causality 
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is not possible given the small number of cases, I believe there is convincing evidence that better 
understanding of how these key variables interact with one another has been achieved. 
While my approach to studying nonviolent movements by comparing the relative strength 
of individual pillars of power is unique, it is also an approach in its infancy, and further research 
is needed to provide greater operational clarity to each of the pillars. I would liken this study to 
looking at the moon through a telescope, which is useful and provides for much greater analysis 
than the naked eye, but is not as good as actually going there and studying on its surface. 
However, in the words of Barnett and Duvall, “power exists at the surface, and also well 
below.”376 I concur with their assessment that “if international relations scholars have erred in 
their past attempts to understand power, it is by trying to identify and rely on a single 
conception.”377 What is needed instead is a comprehensive comparative tool, building upon idea 
of the Correlates of War (COW) index, but which measures the other pillars through which 
countries maintain their grip on power. Such an index could be used to study this alternative 
theory of power across countries and would be useful not only for comparative purposes, but for 
activists who need information in real time in order to understand how to most effectively target 
regimes and whether their pillars of support lie predominantly within or outside of the immediate 
zone of conflict. Future research efforts should focus on analyzing the explosion of NVR 
movements during the Arab Spring to determine whether these findings are consistent, 
particularly given U.S. involvement in many of them. Given the large amounts of data that are 
available now and the various controlling factors for many of these movements (such as religion, 
and ethnic group) that are not accounted for in my study, there is a huge natural experiment 
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which has just dropped into the collective lap of NVR researchers, and not mining it for all it’s 
worth would be a tremendous missed opportunity.  
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